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(1)  Unless otherwise stated, the deﬁ  nition of industry used in the analysis 
corresponds to manufacturing industry excluding energy and construction, 
i.e. the NACE-BEL codes 15 to 37. However, in the direct and cumulative 
approaches of the input-output tables, industry is deﬁ  ned as the sum of total 
manufacturing (15-37), excluding reﬁ  ned petroleum products (23), and of 
mining and quarrying except energy producing materials (13-14), with the aim 
of creating an “energy” category that represents all energy-related costs (mining 
and quarrying, reﬁ  ned petroleum products, production and distribution).
Introduction
For more than a century, industrial activity has been the 
main driving force behind Belgium’s economic develop-
ment. However, for some thirty years, and particularly 
since the ﬁ   rst oil shock, industry has been dogged by 
questions about its future, while service activities have 
grown in importance, beneﬁ   ting especially from the 
remarkable progress of information technologies. These 
questions have become all the more pressing in recent 
times which have been marked by a great deal of uncer-
tainty caused by limited economic growth in the euro 
area, exchange rate movements and the rapid develop-
ment of new economic hubs in the global economy.
The international organisations concerned with economic 
matters, and also various national and regional authori-
ties, particularly in the European countries, have devoted 
a number of studies and reports to these questions in 
recent years. In the spring of 2004, the social partners in 
Belgium asked the Bank to carry out an analysis of Belgian 
industry in light of the changes it is undergoing and the 
challenges that lie ahead.
This article summarises all the work done in this connec-
tion by the Bank and, on certain points, by the Federal 
Planning Bureau (FPB). Some of the work that has fuelled 
the debate has already been the subject of articles 
included in the Economic Review and other work is likely 
to be covered in the Bank’s publications in the next few 
months.
This summary is divided into a section that describes and 
analyses past and recent developments, and a section 
dealing with the necessary conditions and the action that 
economic agents must take in order to face up to the 
challenges of the future. More speciﬁ  cally, the ﬁ  rst sec-
tion analyses the underlying forces to which industry  (1) has 
been exposed throughout the western hemisphere (dein-
dustrialisation and globalisation), highlights the special 
features of Belgian industry in this context and concludes 
with an examination of a number of speciﬁ  c forces that 
are currently at play and which either reinforce the under-
lying trends or hold sway over them. The second section 
makes the general assertion that, faced with these forces, 
which have far-reaching implications for the government, 
ﬁ  rms and workers, an integrated strategy for maintaining 
the competitiveness and adaptability of the economy as 
a whole and, ultimately, its prosperity, is required. It then 
highlights a number of factors that determine that capacity 
(private and public-sector investment, human capital, 
R&D, the ﬁ  nancing of business, environmental considera-
tions) before suggesting the way forward for industrial 



























CHART 1  SECTORAL CHANGES IN BELGIUM
  (Percentages of total value added)





























































































































































































AT 2000 PRICES AT CURRENT PRICES
(1) Deﬁ  ned as NACE-BEL branches of activity 50 to 74.
1.  Understanding structural change in 
the economy
1.1 Underlying  forces
Over the last few decades, the industrial economies have 
been subjected to some powerful trends, including what 
are referred to as deindustrialisation and globalisation, 
both of which have had a particularly marked effect on 
industrial activity. In all of these countries, these phenom-
ena have exerted similar pressures leading to a consider-
able change in the structure of the economies and the 
way in which the production process is organised.
1.1.1 Deindustrialisation
The phenomenon known as deindustrialisation refers to 
the sectoral changes that have been taking place for several 
decades. These are most clearly manifested in the transfer of 
activities and jobs from industry to services, radically chang-
ing the structure of the economy which is now dominated 
by the service sector  : in Belgium, the share of services in 
total value added at current prices increased from 53.4 p.c. 
in 1970 to 74 p.c. in 2003, largely to the detriment of 
industry, whose weight declined from 29.3 to 17.4 p.c.
However, deindustrialisation must be viewed as relative 
rather than absolute, since industrial output has con-
tinued to grow. Moreover, the growth in the volume of 
activity in industry has been on a par with that of market 
services  (1) or the economy as a whole. Thus, measured 
at constant prices, the weight of the main categories of 
activity in total value added in the economy has changed 
little, if at all, over the last thirty years. Moreover, industry 
retains considerable importance in some key areas, such 
as foreign trade and business R&D, in both of which it 
accounts for more than 80 p.c. of the economy’s total.
The forces underlying these sectoral shifts stem from both 
the demand and supply sides. Thus the proﬁ  le of private 
consumption appears to be shifting in favour of services, 
depending on the degree of development of the economy 
in question. Aside from the nominal effect of the slower 
rise in industrial prices compared with those for services, a 
degree of saturation as regards industrial products seems 
to go hand in hand with rising incomes, whereas demand 
for services would appear to be supported by a number of 
socio-demographic developments  : the greater participa-
tion of women in the labour market creates demand for 
childcare services ; the ageing population results in greater 9
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CHART 2  THE NATURE OF GROWTH IN INDUSTRY  
  AND SERVICES IN BELGIUM 
   (Percentages, average annual change between 1970 and 2003) 
Sources : NAI, OECD.
(1) Value added at constant prices.
(2) Value-added  deflator.
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demand for healthcare, while also increasing the amount 
of leisure time available, and, coupled with the liberalisa-
tion of the ﬁ  nancial markets, has a bearing on demand 
for ﬁ  nancial services. Furthermore, industry has achieved 
substantial productivity gains that surpass those achieved 
in the service sector. These productivity gains were made 
possible by the surge in technological progress, which 
industry is better placed than services to incorporate swiftly 
into its production process. The exchangeable nature of 
industrial products is also signiﬁ  cant, as it exposes indus-
trial ﬁ  rms to considerable competitive pressures. Indeed, 
these pressures are intensiﬁ  ed by globalisation, and in par-
ticular the opening up of world trade to low-wage coun-
tries. They are particularly marked in the more traditional 
branches of industry, such as textiles and steel, which 
produce basic goods using a large, low-skilled workforce. 
Services, on the other hand, have hitherto been sheltered 
to some extent from international competition, particu-
larly as a number of markets are not yet fully liberalised.
The substantial productivity growth in industry lies at the 
heart of the mechanism of deindustrialisation, because 
it allowed for a less rapid rise in prices compared with 
the prices of services, which explains the differences in 
the development of the share of activity depending on 
whether it is expressed in terms of value or volume. It also 
fuelled the growth momentum, while reducing the total 
number of industrial jobs in Belgium.
In fact, some 565,000 net jobs were lost in industry 
between 1970 and 2003. But during the same period 
around 1,115,000 net jobs were created in services, spe-
ciﬁ  cally public-sector jobs, until the late 1970s, and after 
that mainly jobs in the health and social work branches 
and in business activities. Overall, taking into account the 
decrease in jobs in other branches, particularly agriculture 
and mining and quarrying, the Belgian economy has 
created some 370,000 jobs since 1970.
The rapid growth of business activities partly reﬂ  ects the 
strengthening of mutual ties between the industrial and 
service sectors due to sectoral shifts and technological 
advances. Generally speaking, industrial output depends 
on the efﬁ  cient provision of services, whilst those serv-
ices can take advantage of the technological advances 
emanating from the industrial sphere to improve their 
productivity. Moreover, in some respects industry and 
services are now tending to share features that used to be 
speciﬁ  c to each of these categories of products and their 
production process, making their distinction blurred and, 
in some cases, superﬂ  uous. On the one hand, technologi-
cal progress allows for the separation of production and 
consumption of a service in time or space, thereby making 
its storage and transportation possible. On the other, the 
production of industrial goods is becoming more and 
more personalised depending on the user’s needs.
In its ever-increasing search for efﬁ  ciency,  industry  is 
focusing on its core business, by outsourcing secondary 
administrative, logistical or organisational tasks, and this 
effectively entails a transfer of activities and jobs to the 
service sector. Consequently, the value added generated 
by the business activities branch showed sustained aver-
age annual growth of 3.6 p.c. between 1980 and 2003, 
compared with GDP growth of 1.9 p.c. Moreover, French 
industry made increasing use of temporary personnel 
during the 1990s (DATAR, 2004), thereby reducing the 
number of jobs recorded in industry and, consequently, 
raising its productivity, as temporary personnel are 
registered as service providers (Gonzalez, 2002  (1)). It can 
be assumed that this phenomenon was also relevant in 
Belgium, given that during the latter half of the 90s, the 
share of industry in temporary work was higher than in 
previous years.
All in all, the relationships between branches of the econ-
omy are such that many non-industrial jobs depend on 
industrial activity. Besides, of the major categories of activity, 
industry is the branch that entails the greatest number 
(1)  This study shows that, between 1996 and 2000, growth in apparent labour 
productivity in industry could be overestimated by 0.5 to 1 percentage point 
a year, relative to a corrected index that takes account of temporary labour in 

















CHART 3  DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CUMULATIVE 
EMPLOYMENT AND OBSERVED EMPLOYMENT (1) 
   (Thousands of salaried and self-employed workers) 
Sources : NAI, NBB calculations. 
(1) Figures based on the input-output tables. Here, industry and energy are defined 
















































































(1)  The drawback of the input-output tables is that they are expressed at current 
prices, which hinders the interpretation of changes from one year to the next.
of indirect jobs. The input-output tables indicate that, in 
2000, the cumulative employment required to produce 
industrial goods exceeded employment observed in the 
industry branch by 257,000 units (Cornille and Robert, 
2005). This means that jobs in other branches used indi-
rectly for the production of industrial goods far exceeded 
the industrial jobs assigned indirectly to other types of 
production. In particular, industry entailed the creation of 
268,000 market-service jobs, some 115,000 of those in 
business activities and 62,000 in the wholesale trade.
Since 1980, industry has made ever-increasing use of 
market services, and business activities in particular, and 
this continued to be the case in the most recent period. 
Thus the number of market-service jobs that depend on 
industry rose from 214,000  in 1995  to 268,000  in 2000, 
which means that industry helped create 54,000 of the 
143,000 jobs generated in market services during that 
period. In fact, for many industrial goods, the second-
round effects of production on market services have 
increased signiﬁ   cantly and, for the whole of industry, 
rose from 25 to 30 centimes per euro of production of 
industrial goods between 1995 and 2000. The result
of this was that the share of intermediate consumption 
of market services in the cumulative cost of production of 
industry climbed from 16.6 to 18.7 p.c. – growth which 
cannot be readily explained by the differences in the 
development of prices  (1).
1.1.2 Globalisation
The other major trend that has profoundly altered the 
environment in which industries develop is the globalisa-
tion of the economy  ; this should not be seen separately 
from the structural changes, behind which it has been a 
key factor.
The notion of globalisation refers to the wave of rapid 
internationalisation of the global economy, which has 
occurred on various fronts over the last few decades  : 
international trade (which multiplied by 3.5 between 
1980 and 2003), capital ﬂ  ows (foreign direct investments 
increased eleven-fold during the same period, having 
peaked in 1999 and 2000 due to the spate of mergers & 
acquisitions), information ﬂ  ows and production organisa-
tion. This globalisation was driven by a policy of liberalising 
national markets, particularly ﬁ  nancial markets, and by the 
conclusion and implementation of numerous multilateral 
(WTO) and regional agreements (ASEAN, EU, MERCOSUR, 
NAFTA) which increasingly led to the opening up of the 
markets for goods and services and capital. In addition to 
the trade in goods, this liberalisation gradually extended 
to services, with domestic markets opening up to foreign 
service providers. However, internationalisation on this 
scale would have been inconceivable without the tech-
nological advances that signiﬁ  cantly reduced the costs of 
transporting not just goods and people, but information 
as well. In addition, it has taken place mostly through 
multinational ﬁ  rms which, according the UNCTAD’s World 
Investment Report 2002, accounted for two thirds of 
global trade in the second half of the 1990s.
These developments triggered a fundamental and ongo-
ing reorganisation of the way in which western industries 
function. Indeed globalisation makes for a more efﬁ  cient 
distribution of the production process, thereby enabling 
the economies in question to raise their level of produc-
tivity and prosperity. Moreover, the opening up of new 
and fast-developing markets presents great opportunities 
for expansion. In the case of the countries of central and 
eastern Europe, this effect was magniﬁ  ed by their geo-
graphical proximity and the prospect of integration in the 
European single market. In China’s case, it is the sheer 
size of the potential market that matters. For consumers, 11
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CHART 4  FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS AND 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN GOODS
   (Current prices, indices 1980 = 100, unless otherwise stated)
Sources : OECD, UNCTAD.
Foreign direct investments 
International trade in goods
(left-hand 
scale) 
Ratio international trade / world GDP
(constant prices, percentages) (right-hand scale)
the intensiﬁ  cation of international trade opens up a wider 
range of reasonably-priced goods and services.
In macroeconomic terms, the consequences of globalisa-
tion, i.e. the rising level of development of the emerging 
countries, resulting in increased demand, and achieved 
productivity gains also beneﬁ  t the developed economies. 
Admittedly, however, the opening up of borders and the 
emergence of new players on the global economic stage 
might pose a threat to some areas of activity and force 
companies to make some difﬁ  cult changes. In the past, 
competition from low-wage countries was keenly felt 
by some branches of activity categorised as traditional, 
insofar as they mass-produced standard goods with low 
value added. The usual response tended to be that the west-
ern industries should specialise in the higher value-added 
products or segments of the production chain. Recent 
developments, however, are beginning to render such 
specialisation somewhat obsolete, insofar as they entail 
increased “all-out” competition  : some of the low-wage 
emerging countries have potential reserves of manpower 
which are far greater than the levels Portugal or the central 
and eastern European countries had available to them in 
the past ; some of these new players are competing in the 
ﬁ  eld of high-tech products (Hungary, Czech Republic) ; relo-
cation now extends to services as well (IT, call centres, etc.) 
which were long thought to be sheltered from this trend ; 
and, ﬁ  nally, there is still increasing competition among the 
western countries, developing similar forms of production.
Consequently, whilst the theory of comparative beneﬁ  ts 
continues to be valid in terms of explaining the relative 
specialisations of the different countries, it now applies 
to a wider range of elements involved in the production 
process  : not just the supply of natural resources or pro-
duction factor volumes, but also human capital, techno-
logical potential, etc. It now implies a qualitative interna-
tional division of labour, with economies ranked according 
to product type (traditional vs. high-tech), or within a 
range of products  –  or even, for a single product, accord-
ing to the degree of complexity and value added of the 
production stage. Consequently the value-added chain is 
becoming increasingly segmented, particularly under the 
inﬂ  uence of the multinationals which are able to optimise 
their production processes at global level. This segmenta-
tion also entails specialisation by function within the pro-
duction process, whereby the design and distribution of a 
product are the preserve of the western economies, based 
on their supply of skilled human capital, and the inter-
mediate stage of mass production is undertaken, at the 
lowest cost, by the low-wage countries (Henriot, 2004).
From an international trade perspective, these develop-
ments have led to the growth of intra-regional and intra-
industry trade. This trend can be observed in every country, 
including Belgium, where intra-industry trade has always 
been particularly important due to the processing nature 
of industry : in 2001, 88.9 p.c. of industry’s foreign trade 
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Ireland : 12 p.c. 
EU–15 (2) = 1,8 p.c. 
CHART 5  GROWTH IN INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY IN THE EU-15 
AND THE UNITED STATES 
   (Average annual percentage change in industry’s value added 
at constant prices, 1980-2003 (1)) 
Sources : GGDC, NAI, OECD. 
(1)  Until 2002 for Ireland and the United Kingdom and until 2001 for the United States. 
(2)  Non-weighted average, excluding Ireland and countries not listed. 
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CHART 6  THE POSITION OF INDUSTRY IN THE ECONOMY
   (Percentages of total value added at current prices)



















Change between 1980 and 2002 (percentage points)
n.
in the 1960s. Therefore, activity in terms of trade and 
competition takes place mainly between countries in close 
proximity offering similar products rather than with low-
wage countries in distant parts of the world.
1.2  The position of Belgian industry
1.2.1 Common  features
Belgian industry has not escaped the underlying forces 
which have just been discussed, so both its recent history 
and current situation display many similarities with those 
of the other European countries. In Belgium, deindustri-
alisation has been both relative, in that it has involved a 
decline in the weight of industry in the economy’s nomi-
nal value added, and absolute in its impact on jobs. At 
the same time, industrial activity grew in real terms by an 
average of 1.9 p.c. per annum between 1980 and 2003, 
outpacing the big European countries. Nevertheless, it has 
proved less dynamic than in other small, open economies 
such as Austria and some of the Scandinavian countries.
Based on its current direct weight in the economy’s total 
value added (18.2 p.c. in 2002), the position of industry in 
the Belgian economy is average for the EU-15. On the one 
hand, the Belgian economy appears to have a less domi-
nant service sector than the major economies that are very 
advanced in this ﬁ  eld, such as the United Kingdom or the 
United States, where industry now accounts for no more 
than 15 p.c. of GDP. On the other, industry plays a less 
prominent part in Belgium than in other major economies 
such as Italy or Germany or some small countries where it 
is newer and based largely on high-tech sectors (Ireland, 
Finland, Sweden) ; in these countries, the share of industry 
is often signiﬁ  cantly greater than 20 p.c.
The relative importance of industry varies greatly across 
the country’s three regions. In 2003, more than 70 p.c. 
of the value added of Belgian industry was generated 
in Flanders. Aside from this region’s total weight in the 
economy, it is also the region with the greatest reliance 
on industry, which accounts for 21.6 p.c. of the region’s 
activity. The share of industry in Wallonia’s value added 
is slightly below the national average. Lastly, due in 
particular to its speciﬁ  c status as a metropolitan region, 
the Brussels region has the most atypical structure, with 
market services accounting for a weight of over 60 p.c. 
compared with less than 50 p.c. for the country as a 
whole  ; consequently, industry represents just a little over 
6 p.c. of activity in that region.
Besides having a similar total weight in the economy, 
Belgian industry displays a relatively similar structure to the 
average in the other EU-15  countries ; generally speaking, 
the differences in specialisation between these countries 
are fairly small (ECB, 2004). Nevertheless, Belgian industry 
does have a number of special features, the most notable 
being the preponderance of chemicals. Having experi-
enced the most vigorous growth of all branches of indus-
try during the last two decades, the chemicals branch 13
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represented 19.8 p.c. of industry’s value added in 2002, 
compared with an average 10.6 p.c. in the other EU-15 
countries. This branch, which includes the pharmaceuti-
cal sector, is in many respects vital to Belgium’s industry 
and economy. It typiﬁ  es its speciﬁ  c features, in particular 
the heavy capitalisation of production, high productivity 
and large foreign ﬁ  nancing through the involvement of 
multinationals. Moreover, the chemicals branch occupies 
a similar position in the country’s two most industrial 
regions, although its weight is a little greater in Wallonia 
than in Flanders. Furthermore, although Flanders has a 
structure which, overall, is much the same as that of the 
country as a whole, Wallonia exhibits a distinct specialisa-
tion in non-metallic mineral products, offset by the under-
representation of the transport equipment branch, which 
is over-represented in Flanders, and especially in Brussels.
Compared with the other countries of Europe, Belgium is 
also notable for its relative shortage of more technological 
products  : the electrical and electronic equipment branch 
totalled 7.4 p.c. of industrial value added in 2002  (1), 
against an average 11.6 p.c. in the EU-15 countries. 
Moreover, Belgium is one of those rare countries where 
this branch has not made one of the biggest contribu-
tions to the growth of industry in recent years. Yet the 
development of such activities and the technologies they 
produce, and also their dissemination across all branches 
including services, go hand in hand with a strengthening 
of both productivity and competitiveness of the advanced 
economies. In Finland and Ireland, which are among the 
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(1)  This weight moves within a range of a little more than one percentage point 

















































CHART 7  EMPLOYMENT IN INDUSTRY 
   (Indices 1970 = 100, number of people employed in industry) 







industrial structure, this branch occupies a dominant 
position of around 22 to 25 p.c.
1.2.2 Distinctive  features
Although the development of industrial activity in Belgium 
has mirrored that of other industrialised countries, this 
has been at the cost of greater adjustments having to be 
made to the production process. The decline in industrial 
employment started earlier and was much more pro-
nounced in Belgium than in the other countries, after 
the oil shocks led to a loss of competitiveness  : between 
1970 and 2003, the number of jobs fell by 48 p.c. in 
Belgium, compared with a decline of around 30 p.c. in 
Germany and France, and of less than 10 p.c. in the 
United States and Italy. Globally, a comparison between 
the United States and Europe reveals that, although the 
same basic trends have dominated on both sides of the 
Atlantic, in Europe the adjustment in industry mainly 
affected the level of employment whilst in the United 
States the effect tended to be on wages (Rowthorn and 
Ramaswamy, 1997).
In fact, because of its degree of openness and its speciali-
sation in the production of intermediate goods, allied with 
high labour costs, Belgian industry has, even more than 
elsewhere, been motivated to achieve major productivity 
gains and to undertake rationalisation investments. 
Consequently, it is notable for its high levels of labour 
productivity and capitalisation.
This rationalisation has been widespread given that, in 
the majority of industry branches in Belgium growth in 
activity has been sustained by productivity gains against 
a backdrop of falling employment. However, the good 
performance of industry as a whole masks the patchy 
development of the different branches. The branches that 
have grown most rapidly owe this fact to the extent of 
productivity gains achieved and broadly stable employ-
ment. Conversely, the weaker growth of some branches 
is due to more extensive restructuring in terms of employ-
ment, which have been offset to a lesser degree, if at all, 
by productivity gains. These heterogeneous performances 
have distinctly altered the structure of Belgian industry 
and explain the strong growth of the chemicals sector, 
for instance.
Although, from a European perspective, Belgian industry 
does not have an atypical structure, it does exhibit a spe-
cialisation in the production of semi-ﬁ  nished goods. This 
processing nature results in a lower value-added compo-
nent of production compared with the other EU countries, 
insofar as this type of production requires an extensive 
use of basic products for intermediate consumption, 
whereas the subsequent stages and resulting value added 
are taken care of by the ﬁ  nal producer. The ratio of value 
added to production, which in recent years has been close 
to 25  p.c., was 3  to 8  percentage points below the level 
achieved by the other countries. This weakness across 
the whole of industry can only to a very small extent be 
explained by an unfavourable structure, because it also 
manifests itself at individual branch level. Moreover, it 
is still apparent if all the relations between the domestic 
branches involved in the production of industrial goods are 
considered, and this is due to leakage effects outside the 
national economy – through imports – that are more 
pronounced than elsewhere. The greater dependence on 
energy than in the other European countries also serves 
to increase intermediate consumption and limit the share 
of value added in production. In this respect, the indus-
trial structure does have an effect, as two of Belgium’s 
three major branches – chemicals and metallurgy – are 
among the largest users of energy. Lastly, compared 
with other small economies for which data are available, 
industry in Belgium seems to make slightly greater use of 
market services, a sign of a higher level of outsourcing of 
activities that are deemed peripheral to the core business, 
which fuels its intermediate consumption.15
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CHART 8  LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY AND CAPITAL INTENSITY IN INDUSTRY
   (Indices Belgium = 100, purchasing power parities based on GDP against the US dollar)
Sources : NAI, OECD.






























































CUMULATIVE CALCULATION DIRECT CALCULATION
CHART 9  VALUE-ADDED CONTENT OF INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT (1)
   (Percentages of output)
Sources : EC, NAI, OECD, NBB calculations.
(1)  The direct calculation relates industrial value added to industrial output, as observed in the annual national accounts. By going up the production chain, the cumulative 
calculation takes account of both the value added generated directly by industry and the value added generated indirectly by all branches of the economy as a result of their 
output for intermediate consumption by industry. As specified in the introduction, in the cumulative calculation based on the input-output tables the delimitation of the 
branches of industry differs somewhat from that generally used in this article.16
(1)  For a discussion of the different meanings of the term “relocations”, see inter alia 
Drumetz (2004), Grignon (2004) and Henriot (2004).
(2)  The balance of payments records FDI in accordance with the speciﬁ  cations set 
by the IMF, which deﬁ  nes FDI as the acquisition of a lasting interest (conditional 
on the holding of at least 10 p.c. of the ordinary shares or voting rights) by an 
entity domiciled in an economy in an enterprise domiciled in another economy. 
Therefore, these statistics, which are purely ﬁ  nancial in nature, do not necessarily 
tell us much about investments in physical capital.
1.3 Speciﬁ  c features of the current situation
1.3.1  Globalisation gathers pace
The enlargement of the EU to include ten new Member 
States (NMS) on 1 May 2004 and the rapidly increasing 
power of large emerging economies such as China and 
India have further highlighted the effects of globalisation, 
which are now encroaching on activities that were long 
thought to be sheltered from this trend. In a context of 
weak economy with an appreciating currency, fears are rife 
in Europe that the decline of industry might gather pace, 
or worse, that this latter could disappear altogether, and 
the debate about the threat of relocations has resurfaced, 
even extending beyond the industrial sphere. Considering 
its reliance on trade and foreign capital, are Belgium’s 
industry and economy particularly vulnerable ? Or are they 
able to play their part in the emerging economic order  ?
Relocations
It should be pointed out that, for our purposes, reloca-
tions should be understood as the cessation of an activity 
in the national economy with a view to replacing it with 
production carried out abroad  (1). Relocations may involve 
foreign direct investments (FDI) in order to develop exactly 
the same activity abroad, or recourse to sub-contracting 
or imports. However, production activities may cease for 
plenty of reasons other than relocation, which must be 
viewed as just one manifestation of the structural changes 
that go hand in hand with economic development. As a 
direct result, relocations give rise to job losses and require 
adjustments within the economy, be it between regions, 
branches or job categories. Ultimately, however, they can 
also ensure the survival of a business, and therefore the 
safeguarding of existing jobs or the creation of new activi-
ties or new jobs.
Generally speaking, the available studies suggest that 
the impact of relocations has been relatively limited thus 
far. According to the studies cited by Grignon (2004), 
they accounted for around 4 p.c. of outgoing French 
FDI between 1997 and 2001 and caused 2 p.c. of job 
cuts involving more than 50 people in the United States 
between 1998 and 2003, whereas investments in the 
countries of central and eastern Europe brought about the 
loss of 90,000 German jobs between 1990 and 2001. 
Based on microeconomic data, Aubert and Sillard (2005) 
estimate that, between 1995 and 2001, 0.35 p.c. of 
French industrial employment was relocated each year, a 
little less than half that ﬁ  gure to the emerging countries.
Nor, based on recent ﬁ   gures on FDI and foreign trade 
which only provide an overall, indirect picture of this 
phenomenon, does Belgium appear to have witnessed 
any surge in relocations in recent years.
Overall, the Belgian economy is still attracting foreign 
investment. According to balance of payments data, 
which record international ﬂ   ows of funds relating to 
investment transactions  (2), the Belgian economy has been 
a net beneﬁ  ciary of FDI, with amounts of foreign invest-
ment in Belgium exceeding Belgian investments abroad 
by 0.7 p.c. of GDP per annum on average between 
1995 and 2003, compared with 0.1 p.c. of GDP in the 
United States and net outﬂ  ows of 0.9  p.c. of GDP for the 
whole of the EU-15. By way of comparison, the NMS and 
China recorded much larger net inﬂ  ows over the same 
period, amounting to a little more than 4  p.c. of their GDP.
Whilst net inﬂ  ows of capital from direct investments have 
ﬂ  uctuated within a narrow band, gross ﬂ  ows of FDI into 
Belgium and of FDI from Belgium to other countries have 
grown very fast since 1995, fuelled by the service sectors. 
These operations have been stimulated by market liberali-
sation, especially in the ﬁ  eld of telecommunications, and 
by technological developments. They took the form of a 
spate of mergers & acquisitions around 2000, at a time 
when the stock market was rising rapidly.
In the space of a few years, the share of market services in the 
total volume of FDI has increased markedly to the detriment 
of industry : in 2003, the former totalled 74  p.c. of incom-
ing FDI and 65.8 p.c. of outgoing FDI respectively. Aside 
from the importance of ﬁ  nancial intermediation services, 
the bulk of these FDI involves the business activities branch, 
which includes coordination centres. These and, to a lesser 
extent, the headquarters of multinationals in Belgium, act 
as hubs, recording very substantial gross incoming ﬂ  ows in 
the form of capital contributions by foreign parent com-
panies  ; these funds are then used to grant loans to the 
various group companies, which constitute outgoing ﬂ  ows.
The recording of FDI on a ﬁ  nancial  basis  sometimes 
distorts the real size of those investments in terms of 
activity and employment. However, the statistics recording 
employment at subsidiaries established abroad (FATS) also 
reveal the growing importance of services in FDI, albeit 
less so than in the volume of FDI. Thus foreign subsidiar-
ies established in Belgium still employ more workers in 
industry than in services, with the chemicals and automo-
tive sectors leading the way. In 2003, business activities 17
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CHART 10  FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS (FDI) FOR BELGIUM 
Sources : UNCTAD, NBB. 
(1)  Ten new EU Member States. 
(2) Excluding  reinvested  profits. 
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CHART 11  BELGIUM’S FOREIGN TRADE WITH THE 
EMERGING ECONOMIES 
Source : NAI.
accounted for just 19 p.c. of jobs at these subsidiar-
ies, compared with almost half of the volume of FDI in 
Belgium. Overall, employment at these subsidiaries of 
foreign ﬁ  rms represents a slowly rising proportion of total 
employment, rising from 13.2 p.c. in 1997 to 16.3 p.c. 
in 2003. As regards the sectoral structure of employment 
at Belgian subsidiaries abroad, this reﬂ  ects the image pre-
sented by ﬁ  nancial stocks. Financial services in particular 
account for a considerable proportion of this.
Looking at the origin and geographical destination of 
FDI, it is apparent that the vast majority of business links 
of Belgian ﬁ   rms occurs with neighbouring countries. 
Consequently, the NMS and China represented just 
1.6 and 0.5 p.c. respectively of Belgian FDI abroad in 
2002. With regard to FDI in Belgium, however, the share 
of investment originating from the US fell markedly from 
16.1 p.c. in 1997 to 8 p.c. in 2003, as a corollary of a 
substantial rise in investments from Europe. This lower 
level of US investments went hand in hand with a reduc-
tion in employment at US subsidiaries established in 
Belgium.
The development of FDI does not simply result from 
relocations – far from it. Among the various possible 
causes, “vertical” FDI are designed to achieve efﬁ  ciency 
gains, by taking advantage of the differences in produc-
tion costs between countries, whilst “horizontal” FDI aim 
to exploit openings on the markets in which they are 
made. Insofar as the majority of incoming and outgoing 
FDI involve neighbouring countries with similar charac-
teristics in terms of resources and factor costs, it is likely 
that they involve either horizontal investments designed 
to accede to or acquire a strategic position in adjacent 
markets or vertical investments in connection with the 
greater segmentation of the production chain. In this 
respect, Belgium’s central location, its transport network, 
the quality of its infrastructures and its highly skilled work-
force are attractive to multinationals seeking to centralise 
their administrative, ﬁ  nancial or distribution activities. As 
regards Belgian FDI abroad, the level of investment in 
emerging economies such as the NMS and China might 
beg the question of whether Belgian business is under-
represented on these rapidly growing markets. FDI made 
in the NMS, which tend to focus more on service activities, 
seem to be predominantly horizontal  (1).
Foreign trade statistics are a second source that might 
indicate the occurrence of relocations, insofar as they 
ought to entail a rise in imports and a decline in exports. 
On this basis, no renewed upsurge in relocations is 
discernable. The balance of trade recorded by industry 
shows a comfortable surplus, which is a major factor 
in the surplus achieved by the economy as a whole. It 
amounted to some 7.5  billion euro in 2004  and is mainly 
attributable to the chemicals and food industries.
However, the overall trade surplus of the Belgian economy 
masks some geographical disparities. It consists of a sur-
plus with the EU and a deﬁ  cit with non-EU countries as 
a whole. In particular, the erstwhile surplus with China 
became a deﬁ   cit in 1998, which widened sharply in 
2004  to 1.2  billion euro. Conversely, the balance of trade 
between Belgium and the NMS remains positive – in the 
region of 0.4  p.c. of GDP between 1995  and 2003  –  and 
in fact reached one of its highest levels in 2003. Generally 
speaking, trade with the NMS and China has intensiﬁ  ed 
to a similar extent  ; between 1995 and 2004, imports of 
goods from these two groups of countries increased by 
around 17 p.c. per annum against growth of 6.4 p.c. in 
all imported goods. Although rising, the share of these 
countries in total Belgian imports remains small, however, 
at around 2.5 p.c. for each group in 2004.
(1)  According to a survey of Belgian companies that have set up establishments in 
the NMS, carried out in 2002 by the FBC, 92 p.c. of those companies took this 
decision in order to gain access to a new market, although the beneﬁ  ts in terms 
of lower wage costs was also a motive for 55 p.c. of them.19
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Although they do not point to a spate of relocations in 
Belgium over the last few years, the indicators used are 
nevertheless partial and ﬂ  awed in this regard. Moreover, 
they predict nothing about the future ; a number of surveys 
have found that the issue of relocation has been consid-
ered by a large number of chief executives. Thus, according 
to the 2004 report of the Conference Board, relocation is 
one of the main preoccupations of 31 p.c. of chief execu-
tives in Europe, as opposed to 24 and 21 p.c. respectively 
of those heading companies in the US and Asia. Moreover, 
Belgian ﬁ  rms appear to differ from their European coun-
terparts, as revealed by the latest edition of the UPS 
Europe Business Monitor survey, published in 2005, which 
found that 28 p.c. of Belgian ﬁ  rms currently sub-contract 
abroad, the second highest percentage of the seven 
countries surveyed after the United Kingdom (33 p.c.). 
The favourite destinations are China and the NMS (both 
of which account for 37 p.c. of outsourcing abroad), 
and the activity most commonly sought is the manufac-
ture of products (42 p.c. of cases). The levels recorded 
here are higher than in the other European countries.
Whatever the true extent of the relocation phenomenon, 
the ongoing rationalisation of production processes is 
a feature in its own right, involving the reallocation of 
activity and employment. Consequently, in a global envi-
ronment relocation must be regarded as just one of the 
manifestations of these structural changes. Some tradi-
tional branches, such as clothing, textiles, leather and 
footwear, have already had to contend with relocations in 
the past, suffering a decline in their activity, job losses and 
external trade deﬁ  cits.
Emerging economies
Recently, the ten new Member States (NMS) of the EU 
and China have become increasingly integrated in the 
European and world economy, with strong growth in trade, 
the receipt of substantial ﬂ  ows of direct investment and a 
change in their economic structure. Apart from the issue of 
relocations, the growing power of these emerging econo-
mies must be put into proper perspective and the chal-
lenges and opportunities this presents have to be deﬁ  ned.
These developments are highly signiﬁ  cant for the coun-
tries of Europe, albeit for differing reasons. The NMS 
are distinguished by their geographical and, henceforth, 
institutional proximity. It is important to remember that, 
although these countries’ actual accession to the EU in 
2004 was a signiﬁ   cant event, it was just one stage in 
a process of integration that was already well advanced 
and is still ongoing. As for China, it is the sheer size of 
its economy that gives it the status of a special player. 
Apart from the fact that the country has beneﬁ  ted from 
an undervalued exchange rate, China’s vigorous growth 
has hitherto been based more on the volume of produc-
tion factors at play, underpinned by plentiful reserves of 
labour, an inﬂ  ux of foreign capital and a very high savings 
ratio, than on the productivity of those factors.
Thus far, these economies have tended to compete with 
low-tech products. In 2002, the industry branch of the 
four largest NMS  (1) mainly had a trade surplus in this type 
of goods, largely as a result of the manufacture of fur-
niture in Poland. This is even more true of China which, 
because of the abundance of production factors at its 
disposal, has focused on the mass production of low-tech 
goods requiring a large amount of low-skilled labour. 
Although, in the wake of earlier relocations and competi-
tion from low-wage countries, our industry can hardly be 
regarded as specialised in this type of goods any longer, 
the challenge this presents is no less real for the branches 
concerned  –  a fact which is borne out by the reaction to 
the deﬁ  nitive lifting of import quotas for textiles at the 
beginning of 2005. Playing the role of “Asia’s factory”, 
China operates as an assembly country, importing basic 
components and high-tech products from Japan and 
other industrialised Asian countries and exporting the 
ﬁ  nished products to the United States, the EU and Japan. 
Consequently, it has a trade deﬁ  cit with these suppliers 
and a surplus with the economies it exports to, Belgium 
among others.
However, both China and the NMS are gradually focusing 
more on the production of higher value-added goods, 
thereby creating competitive pressure in segments that 
tended to be thought of as the preserve of the more devel-
oped economies. Some NMS, in this instance Hungary, 
and, to a lesser extent, the Czech Republic, are already 
moving in this direction, as their industry generates a 
trade surplus with the EU-15 in high-tech products  (2). 
Between 1997 and 2002, the steady increase in Hungary’s 
surplus in radio, television and communication equipment 
was a major factor, ﬁ  rst in the gradual decline of the trade 
deﬁ   cit with the EU-15 of the four largest NMS taken 
together, and then in the surplus achieved in 2002. This 
new industrial focus, built on FDI and accompanied to a 
certain degree by a reindustrialisation of the economy, 
yields parallels with the experience of some of the south-
east Asian countries which, with a skilled workforce and 
low labour costs, had specialised in electronic products.
(1)  Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia. However, these countries have 
differing proﬁ  les, as will become apparent later ; their grouping is affected by 
Poland’s great weight.
(2)  More precisely in radio, television and communication equipment, for Hungary 
in particular, and in ofﬁ  ce and computing machinery. Hungary and the Czech 



































CHART 12  FOREIGN TRADE OF THE EMERGING ECONOMIES
Source : OECD. 
(1)  Difference between the actual balance of trade of the branches of one type of technology and the balance that would result from the breakdown of the total balance of trade 
in proportion to the share of these branches in total exports and imports; a positive result indicates that the balance for a given category of products is greater than that 
category’s weight in trade. 
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Generally speaking, it would seem that the NMS are 
rapidly becoming part of the organisation of the produc-
tion process on a European scale, as evidenced by the 
growing proportion of their intra-industry foreign trade. 
This form of trade already accounts for more than 80 p.c. 
of all trade in Hungary and the Czech Republic, compared 
with a little under 90 p.c. in Belgium. Besides the produc-
tion of increasingly high-tech industrial goods, in future 
they might also compete in R&D or, in the context of an 
economy with an expanding service sector, even in the 
centralised provision of high value-added services for mul-
tinationals. This would bring them into direct competition 
with one of our economy’s specialisations.
As for China, it is already moving rapidly towards a more 
advanced developmental stage, with the emphasis on, 
among other things, R&D. In 2002, total R&D spending 
accounted for 1.2 p.c. of GDP, more than in the whole 
of the NMS or Spain, and was rising sharply. Moreover, 
in terms of the absolute amount of R&D spending China 
was ranked 7th in the world, albeit way behind the United 
States, the EU and Japan. A relatively unusual aspect 
about China, compared with other economies that used 
to specialise in this type of mass production, is its combi-
nation of low labour costs and the simultaneous develop-
ment of research capacities (EC, 2004b). Furthermore, 
thanks to the substantial ﬂ   ows of direct investment it 
enjoys, the Chinese economy is rapidly integrating foreign 
technologies and organisational know-how, while at the 
same time the State is pursuing a voluntarist industrial 
policy designed to develop “national champions” that will 
be able to make their mark in international trade.
However, China’s pursuit of rapid economic develop-
ment will be dependent on numerous factors, including 
the macroeconomic environment and the stability of the 
economy and of its banking system, the ironing out of 
regional disparities, the intensiﬁ  cation of the R&D effort, 
and the creation of effective patent protection laws and 
of a system for combating counterfeiting.21
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While the growing power of the emerging econo-
mies ultimately presents a competitive challenge to 
our economies, the latter must also be quick to seize 
the opportunities offered by the opening up of these 
markets – opportunities that are considerable in China’s 
case – and by the increasing integration of the NMS 
within a pan-European production process. FDI statistics 
are of limited use when assessing Belgium’s position in 
these economies, as the geographical origin of the invest-
ment ﬂ  ows is clearly heavily centred on the activities of 
the ﬁ  nancial centres (Hong Kong, the Virgin Islands for 
China) and the centralist practices of the multinationals 
(the Netherlands for the NMS). Nevertheless, they do 
conﬁ  rm the limited involvement of European countries, 
and Belgium in particular, in China compared with Japan 
and the United States. As regards the NMS, where, logi-
cally, the European effort is greater, Belgian companies 
have focused more on ﬁ  nancial services, primarily in the 
Czech Republic, with the aim of establishing themselves 
on these new markets. In industry, Belgian FDI have 
focused in particular on the mid and high-tech sectors in 
the Czech Republic and Hungary.
The involvement of foreign countries in these emerging 
economies is also manifested in imports from the latter. 
From this point of view, between 1997 and 2004, the 
strengthening of China’s ties with the rest of Asia is clearly 
apparent, to the detriment of relations with the United 
States and the EU-15. Belgium is maintaining its position, 
which is better than the average for the Union, whilst 
Germany is making headway. Germany is also in the fore-
front as regards the increase of the NMS imports from the 
EU-15, in which Belgium is playing its part too.
1.3.2   The environment that typiﬁ  es certain industrial 
branches
Besides the common trends we have discussed thus far, 
each branch of industry develops in its own environ-
ment that may be the source of additional challenges. In 
Belgium’s case, by way of example, the speciﬁ  c context of 
a number of branches can be highlighted.
The past and current development of the textile sector 
exempliﬁ  es the gradual globalisation of a market under 
the inﬂ   uence of international agreements, as this low-
skilled labour-intensive branch has long had to contend 
with competition from low-wage countries. Major ration-
alisation drives ensued, as is apparent from the rise in 
productivity – one of the largest achieved in industry 
between 1980  and 2003. At the same time, employment 
was reduced by 72,000 units, the second biggest fall 
in relative terms among the industrial branches  ; overall, 
growth in activity was one percentage point lower than 
the industrial average. However, Europe’s textile industry 
is now faced with a fresh onslaught of globalisation  : the 
last import quotas were lifted on 1 January 2005, draw-
ing a line under a gradual process of dismantling that 
began back in 1994. China’s admission to the WTO in 
2002 profoundly changed the environment, giving rise 
to fears of a huge inﬂ  ux of competition-busting products 
from 2005  onwards. While the EC sees a way forward by 
concentrating on high-end goods, such markets will how-
ever not be opened up to European exports overnight.
Steel and glass are two branches that illustrate the 
processing nature of Belgian industry and which, as a 
result of mergers & acquisitions, have gradually seen 























¬¬¬    n   
"ELGIUM¬¬¬    n   
'ERMANY¬¬¬       
&RANCE¬¬¬    n   
.ETHERLANDS¬¬¬    n   
5NITED¬3TATES¬¬¬    n   n
!SIA¬¬¬       
3OURCE¬¬)-&
¬22
Against this backdrop, Belgian companies operating in 
these areas have been forced to constantly adapt and 
specialise, by seeking to develop niches.
Meanwhile, the chemical industry, which is dominant in 
Belgium, is one of the most affected by the introduction 
of various international and European environmental 
regulations and by the energy issue. The EC has pub-
lished a white paper on chemical substances, containing 
the REACH system project. The goal of this project is to 
create a single framework for assessing the degree to 
which chemical substances are hazardous and enabling 
the dissemination of information on the subject, through 
a central database of companies that manufacture or 
import more than one tonne a year of a given chemical 
substance. It relies on the active participation of industry, 
which would be responsible for performing the assess-
ments and disseminating the information.
The chemical sector will also be called upon to play a 
major role in achieving the target Belgium has set itself 
under the Kyoto Protocol  : between 1990 and 2001, it 
accounted for 9 p.c. of greenhouse gas emissions by 
all economic agents, with industry’s total amounting to 
34 p.c. of those emissions. Although the chemical sector 
has made signiﬁ  cant efforts by reducing other types of 
air pollution, at the same time it has markedly increased 
its emissions of greenhouse gases (by 31 p.c. between 
1990 and 2001), which are the only gases targeted by 
the Kyoto Protocol. In this area, these efforts have only 
brought about an improvement in terms of eco-efﬁ  -
ciency, i.e. pollutant emissions have increased by less than 
activity. For the whole of Belgium, the Protocol target 
is a 7.5 p.c. reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 
2008-2012, yet these emissions increased by nearly 
10 p.c. between 1990 and 2001. This gives an idea 
of just how much work still needs to be done, be it in 
terms of changes to the production process or the costs 
of buying licences to pollute. The paper and publishing 
branches, which together account for 7.7 p.c. of indus-
trial activity in Belgium, are another example of an activity 
that is subject to severe environmental constraints and 
which will have to show initiative in developing and using 
clean production processes.
Lastly, although the debate surrounding the future of 
energy supply and costs affects the whole of industry, it is 
potentially more pressing for the chemicals branch, which 
(excluding reﬁ  ned petroleum products) is the largest user 
of energy. Energy – both raw and processed – made 
up 9.4 p.c. of the production costs of ﬁ  nal demand for 
chemicals in 2000 (and much more than that for some sub-
branches), compared with an average of 4.3 p.c. for the 
whole of industry excluding reﬁ  ned petroleum products.
2.  Guiding the changes to the economy
The processes of deindustrialisation and globalisation 
requires the constant adjustment of economic structures. 
Although industry is most exposed, this extends now also 
to the service branches. More generally, the role and func-
tioning of all economic agents – companies, households 
and government – are likely to be challenged.
Rather than passively submitting to these changes, which 
are the result of increasingly intense competition, these 
agents must take the necessary adjustments in hand in a 
well-considered and organised way so that they are able 
to limit the negative effects and derive maximum beneﬁ  t. 
By doing so, they will ensure that economic prosperity is 
preserved and developed, while still being able to organ-
ise society according to their shared aspirations. More 
speciﬁ  cally, in future the government and other economic 
agents must act to :
–   maintain a similar production environment to that of 
economies of a comparable developmental level (level 
playing ﬁ  eld), so as not to compound the situation with 
comparative handicaps in terms of production costs, 
tax, social and environmental regulations, infrastruc-
tures and networks ;
–   promote adaptability, insofar as underlying changes are 
inexorable. If this is to be achieved without compromis-
ing the efﬁ  ciency of the goods and services markets, 
action is needed with regard to production factors 
and how they are implemented in order to enhance 
the economy’s potential : R&D and innovation (physical 
capital, new methods of production and organisation, 
innovative products, etc.), human capital (initial and 
continuing training, entrepreneurial spirit, the func-
tioning of the labour market, organisation of working 
hours, etc.) ;
–   take this action while being mindful of all the social and 
environmental goals, aiming in particular to manage 
public ﬁ  nances soundly, maintain social welfare, take 
account of new needs and guarantee sustainable 
development.
Speciﬁ   cally, what is required is a concerted effort to 
mobilise all the available tools and policies at European, 
Belgian and regional level, so as to ensure the competitive-
ness of the economy.
2.1  Conditions for a competitive economy
While the competitiveness of an industry branch is seen 
as its capacity to defend or gain market shares, the com-
petitiveness of the economy as a whole lies in the ability 
to ensure the development of overall productivity and, by 23
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extension, of future income  ; according to the deﬁ  nition 
used in the EC’s competitiveness reports, its aim is to 
ensure a sustained rise in a nation’s standard of living and 
as low as possible a level of involuntary unemployment.
In fact, what we must do is look beyond the traditional 
notion of competitiveness as the ability to produce and 
offer goods and services on the market at a competitive 
price, and take a broader view. Price competitiveness, 
which is bound up with production costs, could then 
be the way for the Belgian economy to retain a role in 
an increasingly international production system within 
which it is mainly in direct competition or partnership 
with its neighbouring countries. Price competitiveness 
is determined by per capita labour costs and labour 
productivity, which together dictate the unit labour costs 
of production, and return on capital, on top of which 
there are the costs of intermediate inputs and the impact 
of exchange rates. Meanwhile, the other, more intangible 
factors – which can be called qualitative or non-price 
competitiveness – together determine the attractiveness 
of an economy and its innovative and adaptive potential, 
through the quality and variety of products available and 
the organisation of production processes. Put simply, price 
competitiveness is playing a more defensive role, preserv-
ing the attainments, whereas non-price factors have more 
to do with an offensive strategy motivated by the need 
to adapt to a global and fast-changing environment. 
These factors include the volume and quality of capital 
stock, including infrastructures, the volume and training 
of human capital, the organisation of labour, R&D efforts, 
the appropriate functioning of the product and factor 
markets. Ultimately, of course, non-price competitiveness 
has a bearing on price competitiveness, by augmenting the 
productivity of labour or lowering the cost of transport or 
capital. It seems to have become indispensable, especially 
insofar as it relates to knowledge – the foundation of 
the Lisbon strategy. In fact, in the globalised environment 
in which we now live, knowledge has become “the rare 
factor of the production function, as capital and technol-
ogy are completely mobile” (Delanghe et al., 2004).
In section 2.2, the main conditions of innovation and 
adaptive capacity will be reviewed. First, the two aspects of 
competitiveness will be looked at in general terms, by high-
lighting Belgium’s position and that of industry in particular.
2.1.1   Price competitiveness : constituents of 
production cost
Belgian industry is characterised by high labour costs, 
although in recent times the cost trend has been neu-
tral, if not to say slightly favourable. An international 
comparison of wage levels requires a certain restraint 
towards statistical information as regards the degree of 
harmonisation of data and because of the inﬂ  uence of the 
sectoral structure and the composition of employment in 
each country. Clearly, however, Belgian industry’s hourly 
 
 
CHART 13  PRICE AND NON-PRICE COMPETITIVENESS
Non-price = 
all determinants of an 
economy’s attractiveness
and innovative potential
Competitiveness of the economy
in the broad sense, i.e.
– Private and public investment (infrastructures, etc.)
– Human capital : training, organisation of work
– Research and development
– Functioning of the markets 
– Sustainable development
– Unit labour costs
    – hourly wage
    – productivity
– Return on capital
– Costs of intermediate inputs
– Exchange rates
Price =
Costs and structure of production
Acts on
    – Products : quality, range, etc.
    – Production process : organisation, etc.
– Etc.24
labour costs are among the highest in the EU-15, due 
mainly to additional charges  (1). These account for 91 p.c. 
of gross direct compensation, one of the three highest 
rates of the EU-15 along with Italy and France. The 
Scandinavian countries’ labour costs are close to or higher 
than Belgium’s, albeit because they have higher gross 
compensation. As for the four main NMS, their labour 
costs are signiﬁ   cantly lower – almost 30 p.c. lower than 
Portugal’s, the EU-15  country with the lowest labour costs.
Regardless of the high level of wages, their development 
in Belgian industry has been fairly restrained over the last 
ﬁ  ve to seven years. Between 1997  and 2002, the average 
annual growth of 3 p.c. in industrial wages was less 
pronounced in Belgium than in the majority of the 
EU-15 countries, and France and the Netherlands in 
particular where industrial wages grew by 0.6 and 
1.3 percentage point faster each year. It was, however, 
somewhat higher than in Austria and Germany, by 0.4 and 
0.6 percentage point respectively. That said, productivity 
gains more than offset the rise in wages such that, between 
1997 and 2004, unit labour costs rose by just 0.1 p.c. a 
year, way below the pace in the Netherlands (1.8 p.c.) 
but faster than in Germany, where they contracted by 
0.3 p.c. a year, and in several countries, France and 
Austria included, where they substantially fell. Moreover, 
in the four largest NMS, the development of unit labour 
costs has been patchy, under the combined inﬂ  uence of 
substantial rises in hourly labour costs and productivity  (2). 
While unit production costs in industry would have 
shrunk in Poland and moderately risen in the Czech 
Republic, they would have increased markedly in Slovakia 
and, at 4.5 p.c. per annum, even more so in Hungary. 
All of which serves as a reminder that the convergence 
process upon which these economies have embarked is 
helping to gradually bring their wage and productivity levels 
into line with those of the EU-15 countries, perhaps 
further eroding their competitive advantage in terms of 
production costs.
In Belgium, since 1996, despite hourly wages having 
grown faster in industry than in the service branches, unit 
labour costs of production have risen far more slowly in 
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CHART 14  LABOUR COSTS IN INDUSTRY 
Sources : EC, Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln, OECD. 
(1)  Calculations based on national data, which are not always fully harmonised.  
(2)  Figures from 2002 for the four new Member States. 
(3)  Social security contributions, incentive bonuses, holiday pay. 
Direct gross compensation 
Additional costs (3) 
UNIT LABOUR COSTS 
(average annual percentage 
change between 1996 and 2004)
HOURLY LABOUR COSTS 
(average annual percentage  
change between 1996 and 2002) 
HOURLY LABOUR COSTS (1) 
(level in euro, 2003 (2)) 
(1)  Social security contributions, incentive bonuses, holiday pay.
(2)  These substantial changes in wages and productivity call for a circumspect view 
of the conclusions regarding unit labour costs, insofar as differences in measure 
or source in their two constituents can easily tip the balance in favour of an 
improvement or deterioration. Moreover, the development of the exchange rate 
must also be considered, which is not the case in chart 14, which is based on 
ﬁ  gures in local currency.25
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production costs in industry, insofar as the latter is an 
intermediate consumer of services. Generally speaking, 
there are still two stumbling blocks in terms of the devel-
opment of labour costs  : pay rises outside the framework 
of collective wage agreements, which propel the wage 
drift, must be constantly monitored and productivity 
gains must become much more widespread in the service 
branches in order to rein in unit labour costs.
Industrial companies’ production costs are affected by 
factors other than the cost of labour, i.e. gross operating 
surplus and gross mixed income, which are representative 
of corporate proﬁ  t and the income of the self-employed 
(which are relatively numerous in Belgium) and the costs of 
intermediate consumption, particularly imported, which is 
an especially large component in Belgium. In comparison 
with other European countries, it appears that in Belgium 
wages constitute the smallest share of the total cost of 
production in industry, based on either a direct com-
parison of labour costs with industrial output (15 p.c.) 
or the sum of industrial wages and wages in the other 
upstream branches, i.e. after incorporating the structure 
of domestic intermediate consumption costs (27 p.c.)  (1).


























DIRECT COSTS  CUMULATIVE COSTS 
Taxes net of subsidies on products 
Intermediate imports 
Domestic intermediate consumption 
Taxes net of subsidies on production 
Gross operating surplus and gross mixed income 
Compensation of employees 
CHART 15  STRUCTURE OF THE PRODUCTION COST IN INDUSTRY (1)
  (Percentages of total, 2000)
Sources : EC, NAI, NBB calculations. 
(1)  Figures based on the input-output tables. Here, industry is defined according to the concept used for the analysis of these tables. Countries are ranked in ascending order of 
the share of wages. 
The lower share of labour costs in the cost of production in 
Belgian industry means that intermediate imports seem to 
have much more of a decisive inﬂ  uence than elsewhere ; yet 
they are a cost constituent over which Belgian companies 
have little control, notwithstanding the protection that is 
now afforded by monetary union in terms of ﬂ  uctuations 
in exchange rates against the euro area partners. By way of 
comparison, in large, less open economies such as France 
and Germany, wages make up 42 and 47 p.c. respectively 
of cumulative production costs, against 27 p.c. in Belgium.
Energy is a particularly large component of intermediate 
production costs and is very sensitive to major price 
changes in the world’s oil markets. Its share in the cumu-
lative production cost of industry appears to be fairly 
high in Belgium  : in 2000, intermediate consumption 
of products included in the energy branches (crude and 
reﬁ   ned petroleum products, production and distribu-
tion, etc.) accounted for 4.4 p.c. of the cost of industrial 
production in Belgium, compared with 3 to 3.5 p.c. for 
Germany, Austria and Finland and less than 3 p.c. in 
Denmark and France. However, it was even greater in 
the Netherlands, where it reached 5.3 p.c. Moreover, 
at almost two thirds the imported share of the energy 
cost was highest in the Netherlands and Belgium. In 
the majority of European countries, the importance of 
energy in the production process increased between 
1995 and 2000 due to rising oil prices. Only Finnish and 
(1)  Generally speaking, the switch from direct costs to cumulative costs causes 
non-wage compensation to rise more sharply than wages, as it involves 
incorporating the value added of service branches, in which the income of the 
self-employed makes up a bigger share.26
Austrian industry managed to reduce the relative size of 
their energy bill over this period.
2.1.2  Other competitiveness factors and synthetic view
By its very nature, non-price competitiveness has many 
facets, the main ones of which will be examined in the 
following section. However, thanks to international rank-
ings prepared by some institutions, the overall competitive 
position of the Belgian economy, or a subset of it, can be 
assessed synthetically. Hence, the IMD (1) rankings combine 
quantitative elements, including price competitiveness, 
with qualitative elements, compiled using the results 
of an annual opinion poll of managers of multinational 
companies. In 2005, Belgium was ranked 24th out of the 
60 countries and regions analysed, with an index score of 
67.5 (United States = 100) and tenth among the EU-15 
countries. It has therefore dropped six places compared 
to the 2003  ranking, due mainly to the progress made by 
other countries. In terms of qualitative elements, Belgium 
was given a positive assessment for its infrastructure and 
international openness, and a negative assessment in 
terms of taxation (especially of natural persons), its institu-
tional and legal framework as well as its labour market.
The indicator calculated by the World Bank, which is 
based solely on non-price elements, gives a more positive 
image of the regulatory environment in Belgium. Since 
2003, this institution has published an annual report 
entitled “Doing business” based on an in-depth study 
of the legal and regulatory framework, as well as the 
actual reality in which ﬁ  rms operate. In contrast to the 
IMD, which surveys the managers of multinational com-
panies, the World Bank study focuses on the environment 
facing SMEs, which represent a vital part in the economic 
fabric in Belgium. In the most recent edition of the report 
(World Bank, 2004), Belgium is ranked 16th out of the 
145 countries making up the study as well as ﬁ  guring 
among the 10  countries to have introduced most reforms 
in 2003, notably in the areas of starting a business (one-
stop shop), hiring and ﬁ  ring workers (service vouchers) 
and getting credit (positive central credit ofﬁ  ce). Generally 
speaking, the World Bank notes that the main reforms 
in 2003 took place within the EU, either in the NMS or 
in the old Member States, through the impetus given by 
the NMS.
The non-price competitiveness of an economy can also 
be generally expressed in the capacity shown by its prod-
ucts to be present on buoyant international markets. The 
structure of Belgium’s foreign trade can thus be compared 
with the degree of dynamism exhibited by export mar-
kets. During the period 1995-2002, it would seem that 
Belgium’s export structure was favourable for 44 p.c. 
of total exports and unfavourable for 56 p.c. This latter 
percentage includes regressive products – i.e. products 
for which the rise in foreign demand is low – in which 
Belgium specialises (primary plastics products, iron and 
steel, etc.) and progressive products in which it does 
not specialise (technological products such as electrical 
machinery and apparatus, ofﬁ  ce, automatic data process-
ing and telecommunication equipment and apparatus, 
etc.). Taking account of the weighting of products in 
Belgium’s trade, the foreign trade structure by product 
impacted slightly negatively on the growth of Belgium’s 
export markets between 1995 and 2002, in contrast to 
the three neighbouring countries where this structural 
effect had a positive effect.
(1)  Institute for Management Development.
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CHART 16  SHARE OF ENERGY IN THE PRODUCTION COST 
IN INDUSTRY (1)
   (Percentages of total, 2000)
Sources : EC, NAI, NBB calculations. 
(1)  Figures taken from the calculation of cumulative costs based on the input-output 
tables. Here, industry and energy are defined according to the concept used for 
the analysis of these tables. 27
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CHART 17  SYNTHETIC INDICATORS OF COMPETITIVENESS
Sources : IMD (2005), World Bank (2004) and own calculations.
(1)  The number in brackets refers to the position in the global ranking, based on 60 countries and regions analysed.
(2)  EU-15 countries ranked higher than Belgium and selection of other countries. Those EU-15 countries not included in the table are ranked lower than Belgium.
(3)  The chart shows, for each category, the average rankings achieved by Belgium in 2003 for all of the category indicators. In theory, the average is between 1 and 115, a lower 
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EU-15 country scores 
(indices US = 100) 
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Belgium among the ten leading
countries in terms of reforms,
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2.2   Elements of the economic development 
potential
To a large extent, the elements determining the non-price 
competitiveness of the economy, namely its capacity to 
develop and adapt, are the same as the factors inﬂ  uenc-
ing its growth potential. Consequently, they can be linked 
either to capital stock, labour or total factor productivity, 
i.e. the effectiveness with which the factors are combined 
in the production process.
2.2.1 Capital  stock
Capital stock, which is the economy’s total production 
capacity, is constantly changing and it is essential that 
the rate of private and public investment is such that the 
capital stock can be replenished both in qualitative terms, 
by integrating new technologies, and quantitative terms, 
beyond the routine replacement of depreciated capital.
One feature of the Belgian economy is its relatively high level 
of private non-residential investment compared to many 
European countries. This can be compared with the asser-
tion already made regarding the extent of capital intensity 
and, as a result, strong apparent labour productivity. 
Moreover, although Belgium does not specialise in ICT pro-
duction, it has one of the highest rates of ICT investment in 
the EU-15, due to ofﬁ  ce automation and information tech-
nology equipment. Using these technologies does admit-
tedly help increase labour productivity as production fac-
tors, i.e. capital and labour, are combined more effectively.
In contrast to the situation in place for private investment, 
the Belgian economy is characterised by the weakness of 
public investment which is clearly below the European 
average, both in gross and net terms. Hence, between 
1990 and 2003, net public investment was zero on aver-
age, which means that gross investment merely offset 
the depreciation of the existing capital. During the same 
period, annual net public investment amounted to 0.9  p.c. 
of GDP in the EU-15. With the rate of net investment 
remaining at zero, recent evidence, since 2000, leads to 
the same conclusion.
This represents a major obstacle to the future develop-
ment of the economy insofar as the private sector is 
unable to undertake certain investments on the one 
















































































































































































CHART 18  INVESTMENT
  (Percentages of GDP)
Sources : EC, GGDC, OECD.
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efforts may give rise to ripple effects and a virtuous circle. 
Insufﬁ   cient public investment can therefore jeopardise 
the economic infrastructure, especially the transport and 
communication network which is one of the factors which 
makes our economy attractive, and which appears to be 
a condition for the performance of the most dynamic 
regions (cf. infra).
2.2.2 Human  capital
The dynamism of an economy, especially where the wish 
is for it to be knowledge-based, also lies in the skills and 
potential of its labour force. Human capital proves to be 
a key factor for potential growth in several respects  : in 
quantitative terms via the supply of labour, in qualitative 
terms via initial and continuing training, and through the 
effective organisation of labour.
As far as quantitative factors are concerned, the low par-
ticipation rate, particularly of the oldest workers, and the 
continued high level of unemployment are well-known 
shortcomings of the Belgian labour market. They are a 
burden on the economy’s employment rate, one of the 
lowest in the EU-15. In addition to the number of persons 
employed, the working time also inﬂ  uences the supply 
of labour. In this regard, the average number of hours 
worked per week in Belgian industry is noticeably less 
than that for the EU-15 (36.8 hours compared to 38.5 
in 2003). This is largely explained by a shorter full-time 
working week  (1)  ; in fact, although recourse to part-time 
work is more common in Belgium than elsewhere, it takes 
the form of a longer working week in Belgium  (2), in such 
a way that, overall, when compared with the EU-15, the 
weekly time spent in part-time work is only 24 minutes 
longer. In Belgium, as in most of the other countries, the 
average working time is greater in industry than in the 
economy as a whole as recourse to part-time working 
is not as great, the full-time hours worked, incidentally, 
being less.
The poor matching of labour supply and demand is another 
structural problem of the labour market in Belgium. In an 
attempt to remedy this, the High Employment Council 
recommended the implementation of the necessary con-
ditions for greater geographical, sectoral and professional 
mobility among workers and improved access to both 
initial and continuing training.
As far as this qualitative aspect of human capital is con-
cerned, Belgium is very well positioned in terms of initial 
training, with a high rate of people holding a higher 
secondary certiﬁ  cate (82.1 p.c. of young people aged 15 
to 24 in 2004), close to that of the European countries 
performing best in this respect. Yet the rate of people 
holding higher education certiﬁ  cates in science and engi-
neering subjects, from which the leading R&D employees 
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(1)  The measure used here, namely hours actually worked, is subject to the inﬂ  uence 
of temporary unemployment. With regard to the Belgian economy as a whole, 
the average working time is also less than that of the EU-15 but the difference 
is smaller than for industry due to the narrower gap in the average full working 
time (40.2 hours in Belgium compared to 40.6 in the EU-15).
(2)  In 2003, Belgian industry ranked 2nd and 3rd respectively for these two criteria.30
accounted for 1.01  p.c. of the population between the 
ages  of  20  and  29  in  Belgium  compared  to  1.19  p.c. 
in the EU-15  and over 2  p.c. in the top three European 
countries. One alternative would be to attract qualified 
personnel  from  abroad  but  at  present  the  brain  drain 
tends to be from Europe to the United States.
Continuing  training  is  just  as  crucial  as  initial  training,   
especially  with  regard  to  keeping  older  workers  in 
employment.  The  most  recent  results  available  from 
the labour force survey show that, based on 2003, the 
continuing  training  effort  in  Belgium  is  slightly  below 
the European average, whilst falling a long way short of 
the  most  dynamic  countries,  namely  the  Scandinavian 
countries, the United Kingdom or the Netherlands. The 
CVTS  (Continuing  Vocational  Training  Surveys),  which 
are  conducted  less  frequently  (1)  than  the  labour  force 
surveys, enable an in-depth analysis to be carried out of 
continuing  training  in  the  branches  of  activity.  Despite 
indicating a considerable increase in the training practices 
within  Belgian  industry  between  1993  and  1999,  such 
practices appear to be unequally distributed among firms. 
The participation rate is thus relatively high among firms 
effectively offering formal training, namely in the shape 
of courses or placements outside of the workplace but 
the overall supply of formal training is average compared 
to  other  countries  and  it  covers  quite  a  small  number 
of  hours.  However,  this  must  be  qualified  by  the  fact 
that continuing training is also organised on an informal 
basis, especially within industry, consisting of an on-the-
job training. These practices, which are more difficult to 
measure, are likely to be more common in SMEs, of which 
there is an abundance in Belgian industry  (2).
In Belgium, the social balance sheets indicate that formal 
training is more present in branches subject to rapid tech-
nological change, resulting in marked variations between 
branches  of  industry.  Furthermore,  in  those  branches 
where there is a lower proportion of low-skilled manual 
workers, it is noticeable that sectoral funds, in principle 
targeted at risk groups, are assigned to all workers. This 
might indicate a lack of general resources within firms. 
Finally, the formal training effort increases with the size 
of  the  firm.  Hence,  refined  petroleum  products  and 
metallurgy  figure  among  the  three  branches  which,  in 
2002,  had  already  reached  targets  in  terms  of  budget 
(included in the interprofessional agreement of 1998) and 
participation in training, a target set by the Employment 
Conference of September 2003. In accordance with these 
targets, in 2004  the private sector as a whole should have 
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(1)  The last dated survey is based on 1999.
(2)  The study of Sels et al. (2002), based on a survey among Flemish SMEs, shows on 
the contrary that the SMEs which theoretically offer a large potential of  
on-the-job training on account of their organisation and the nature of their tasks, 
are also the enterprises which invest the most in formal training, especially in 
industry.31
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ought to attain a participation rate of 50 p.c. by 2010. 
Insofar as these are overall targets, a parallel can be drawn 
in this respect with the target of 3 p.c. of GDP for R&D 
spending (cf. infra). While this latter factor does not guar-
antee the spread of knowledge and innovation, training 
targets, even if adhered to by the private sector as a whole, 
do not ensure that training efforts will be allocated in a 
harmonised manner. One considers, in particular, the many 
SMEs operating in our economy, whose size appears to 
represent an obstacle in gaining access to formal training.
Irrespective of the volume of work and the labour skills 
deployed, the potential of human capital also depends 
on work being organised in an effective manner. Beyond 
the high level of apparent labour productivity in Belgian 
industry, this organisation can be looked at with the aid 
of some partial indicators.
Generally speaking, in all of the EU-15 countries, tempo-
rary work is less common in industry than in ﬁ  rms as a whole 
and this difference is even greater in Belgium  : 5.7 p.c. 
of industrial jobs in Belgium are temporary contract posi-
tions compared to an average of 8.4 p.c. in the EU-15 
and 7.3 p.c. in ﬁ  rms as a whole in Belgium (10.8 p.c. 
in the EU-15). Here, a lesser importance of seasonal work 
is in evidence, as is the need for industry to have staff 
trained in the speciﬁ   c production techniques of each 
branch. This preference for a stable workforce is under-
lined by the temporary unemployment ﬁ  gures  –  only 
available for Belgium – inasmuch as industry is affected 
by the latter to a greater extent than the broad mass of 
branches (1). It would therefore appear that industrial ﬁ  rms 
prefer to use this practice rather than parting with trained 
staff or resorting to temporary labour. Within the indus-
trial sector, temporary unemployment affects the dia-
mond and clothing branches in particular, which reveals 
a certain degree of vulnerability to economic conditions.
In terms of unsocial hours, so-called in line with the ter-
minology of the EC’s labour force surveys, it is evening or 
night work, as opposed to weekend work, which appears 
to affect industry in Belgium more than it does the other 
branches. At European level, where only ﬁ  gures for ﬁ  rms 
as a whole are available, it is noticeable that unsocial 
hours, whatever form they take, are less common in 
Belgian ﬁ  rms than their counterparts in most of the other 
EU-15 countries. The same is true of shift or teamwork  : 
in Belgium, this is more common in industry than in ﬁ  rms 
as a whole, in the same way as variable working time or 
ﬂ  exitime are less common. However, shift work in ﬁ  rms 
as a whole is less common in Belgium than in most other 
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(1)  However, much less than the construction sector.32
A safe and untroubled working environment also helps to 
ensure that the production process runs smoothly, espe-
cially in industry where the risks involved may be greater. 
In this respect, and as far as one can judge, Belgian 
industry generally ranks at the European average in terms 
of work-related accidents or risks perceived by workers. 
Both in Belgium and in the EU-15, the construction, agri-
culture and transport branches appear to be more at risk. 
However, the dispersion within industry is considerable. 
Yet some branches where there are signiﬁ  cant objective 
risks, such as the reﬁ  ned  petroleum  products  branch, 
the nuclear industry and chemicals, are less dangerous, 
whether it be in terms of hard and fast statistics or accord-
ing to workers’ perception. This is obviously a result of the 
security measures taken.
Pressure in the workplace certainly exists since, in the EU-15, 
36 p.c. of those employed in industry are permanently 
or almost always subject to strict deadline constraints, as 
against 29  p.c. for branches as a whole. Finally, although 
complaints of harassment are less common in the area of 
industry (6 p.c. of workers in 2000 compared to an aver-
age of 9 p.c. in the economy as a whole) in the EU-15, 
they are, as far as the economy as a whole is concerned, 
more widespread in Belgium than in the EU-15. This does 
not necessarily mean that harassment is more prevalent, 
but perhaps that there is a greater awareness of the phe-
nomenon, resulting in a greater number of complaints.
2.2.3  Research and development
Research and development (R&D) plays a crucial role in 
maintaining and increasing competitiveness, allowing 
new products and production processes which are more 
efﬁ  cient, less costly and more respectful of societal con-
straints to be developed. In so doing, it ensures that the 
economy is dynamic and attractive by adopting a long-term 
approach. It gives rise to the development of new machines 
and technologies which perform better than those of 
the previous generation. Investing in these is important 
so as to maintain the competitiveness of the economy.
From implementing R&D to a concrete product or process 
application involves a large number of stages, for which 
a harmonised and consistent policy is required. Since the 
Lisbon and Barcelona European Councils in 2000 and 
2002 respectively, R&D and innovation have been at the 
heart of the strategy aimed at making the EU the most 
competitive, knowledge-based economy.
However, Europe is not only struggling to catch up 
with the United States in this area but actually fell 
further behind in the second half of the 1990s. The 
overall shortage of funds earmarked for R&D stems 
from a lesser involvement of the private sector, plus 
a lack of researchers and inadequate exploitation of 
results. Against this background, Belgium stands midﬁ  eld 
among European countries, although it does exhibit some 
special features. The data currently show that total R&D 
expenditure (for which the European target is 3 p.c. of 
GDP by 2010) amounted to 2.2 p.c. in 2001, above the 
European average of 2 p.c., yet way short of the best 
performers, Sweden and Finland (4.3 and 3.4 p.c. of GDP 
respectively), as well as the United States (2.8 p.c.) and 
Germany (2.5 p.c.). Belgium has been catching up, how-
ever, this ratio recording a sharp increase in recent times : 
between 1998 and 2001, R&D expenditure expressed as 
a percentage of GDP grew at an average rate of 4.5 p.c., 
one of the highest in the EU-15. Even over a longer 
period (1993-2001), Belgian growth was considerably 
greater than that of the EU-15. Nevertheless, the target 
of 3 p.c. remains a long way off, whereas it has already 
been exceeded in the most advanced countries, namely 
Sweden and Finland. According to the FPB (Biatour et al., 
2005), starting from the level of 2001, the annual growth 
rate in R&D expenditure required to meet the 2010  target 
is slightly greater than that recorded over the period 
between 1993  and 2001 (7.2  p.c.) but less than the rate 
(8 p.c.) recorded since 1995. Taking past performance 
(1)  According to unofﬁ  cial ﬁ  gures from the Federal Science Policy Service, R&D 














































CHART 19  R&D EXPENDITURE BY SOURCE OF FUNDS
   (Percentages of GDP, 2003 (1))
Source : EC.
(1)  2002 for Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom, 2001 for Belgium (1) , Greece, the 
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as a basis, the same study also estimates that the onus 
for achieving this target looks set to fall on the Flemish 
and Walloon regions, which will have to make up for the 
stagnation seen in Brussels.
In fact, based on the expenditure accounted for by 
ﬁ  rms, which amounted to almost three quarters of the 
total in 2001  (1), the increase in R&D intensity between 
1995 and 2001 was more marked in Flanders than in 
Wallonia, while no increase was recorded in Brussels. In 
relation to regional value added, the R&D expenditure 
of ﬁ   rms in 2001 totalled 2.2 p.c. in Flanders, 1.7 p.c. 
in Wallonia – a ratio close to the national average of 
1.8 p.c. – and 0.7 p.c. in Brussels.
Under the terms of the Barcelona European Council, 
two thirds of R&D funding should come from the private 
sector. This is already more or less the case in Belgium, 
especially if foreign funding, the majority of which is 
private, is taken into account. However, a major effort 
is still required from the private sector if it is to achieve 
its implicit target of 2 p.c. Furthermore, whereas the EU 
is suffering generally from a shortage of private funding 
compared to the United States, in Belgium there is a lack 
of both execution and funding at government level  ; in 
2001, the State’s share in funding was the second lowest 
in the EU-15. The public funding of R&D expenditure 
is also inﬂ   uenced by the institutional development of 
Belgium where the regions are gradually supplanting 
federal government. On the other hand, Belgian R&D 
beneﬁ  ts from a high level of foreign involvement which, in 
relation to GDP, ensures one of the highest contributions 
in the EU-15.
The nature of its activity means that industry is the main 
pillar for R&D. This applies even more so in Belgium 
because of the relative weakness of public involvement. 
Nevertheless, compared to other countries, the intensity 
of the R&D effort can appear insufﬁ  cient  : in relation to 
industrial value added, it amounted on average to 6.5 p.c. 
between 1997 and 2001, a level above that of the 
Netherlands, Denmark and the United Kingdom, yet 
below that of France and Germany. This overall view is 
misleading, however, since an analysis by industrial branch 
reveals that, in all of the branches except transport, the 
R&D effort is greater than in these last two countries. The 
difference observed at aggregate level can therefore be 
explained in terms of the transport equipment branch 
alone. In fact, this branch tends to be very active in R&D 
in the major countries, due clearly to its aeronautical, rail 
and automotive design activities, whereas Belgium is more 
oriented towards assembly.
Among industrial branches, the predominance of chemi-
cals, and more particularly pharmaceuticals, is once more 
felt. During the last ten years, R&D expenditure by the 
pharmaceutical industry has grown twice as quickly as 
expenditure by ﬁ  rms on the whole, bringing its share of 













CHART 20  ROLE OF INDUSTRY IN R&D 
   (Percentages of industry in business R&D expenditure, 
1997-2001 average (1)) 
Source : OECD. 
(1)  1997-1999 average for Denmark and 1997-2000 average for the United States, 



















































CHART 21  SCIENTIFIC PATENTS
   (Number of patents (1) per million inhabitants, 2002)
Source : EC.
(1)  Patent applications to the European Patent Office (EPO) and patents granted by 
the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).
(1)  To which must be added expenditure in other sectors, in particular higher 
education.34
the total above 20 p.c. in 2001. This focus on one sector 
(which, furthermore, is highly dependent on foreign 
countries owing to the number of multinationals operat-
ing in Belgium) may in future prove to be a danger. In 
particular, it will be instrumental in meeting the Barcelona 
target. However, the branch with the most intensive R&D 
effort in relation to its value added is electrical and optical 
equipment  : in 2001, this amounted to 24.7 p.c. com-
pared to 17.8 p.c. for chemicals and 7.7 p.c. for industry 
as a whole.
R&D expenditure alone is not enough  ; what matters is 
that it can be translated into results and concrete applica-
tions, assessable in several stages. At the scientiﬁ  c level, 
the number of publications in Belgium is slightly above the 
European average. However, despite increasing rapidly in 
recent times, there is a shortage of patent applications in 
our economy. On the other hand, the Belgian economy 
is well positioned in terms of innovation, especially in 
industry. According to the EC innovation survey, half of 
the companies with 10 or more employees are reported 
to have innovated a product and/or process during the 
period 1998-2000. This performance is second only to 
Germany. Even though the high level of scientiﬁ  c research 
appears to be struggling to produce patented applica-
tions, innovation is nevertheless present.
In the ﬁ   nal report to its work, “Belgium’s High Level 
Group 3 %” (2005), set up in 2004 by the federal min-
ister responsible for scientiﬁ  c policy, strongly qualiﬁ  ed the 
usefulness of the 3  p.c. target for a small, open economy 
such as Belgium, R&D having “become a movable pro-
duction factor over time”. It also called into question the 
distribution target between the private and public sectors, 
modelled too much on the American situation, assessing 
that, in reality, the lion’s share of efforts should be the 
responsibility of the private sector while also underlining 
the insufﬁ   cient amount of public research. According 
to the High Level Group, the main problems of R&D in 
Belgium go beyond the ﬁ   gure of overall expenditure. 
As far as the deployed resources are concerned, besides 
the shortage of public funds already highlighted, the 
concentration of private expenditure in the hands of a 
limited number of multinational companies means that 
they are susceptible to one-off events, such as one com-
pany’s decision to relocate. Moreover, although there is a 
highly-skilled workforce to support R&D in Belgium, the 
cost of such a workforce is too high and a career as a 
researcher is not attractive enough. In terms of opportu-
nities, research results are not translated into innovations 
in a sufﬁ  cient enough manner and the dissemination of 
these results is inadequate owing to a framework which is 
generally too rigid. The gap between the high-tech focus 
of R&D and the specialisation of Belgian industry in the 
low and medium-tech segments is particularly illuminat-
ing in this respect. Finally, as regards innovation policies, 
the High Level Group highlights the risk of dual fragmen-
tation : between different policies (a risk which also exists 
in other countries) but also in institutional terms where 
regional initiatives lack a common vision monitored at 
federal level.
2.2.4  Financing of ﬁ  rms
In addition to the real factors mentioned above, the per-
formance of both our industrial and non-industrial ﬁ  rms 
also implies that a certain number of ﬁ  nancial conditions 
are fulﬁ   lled. Indeed, it is essential that their ﬁ  nancial 
soundness is ensured and that they generate a sufﬁ  cient 
amount of own resources, while at the same time having 
access to external funding which is varied and tailored 
to their situation. In this respect, there are a number of 
distinctive characteristics to Belgium’s industrial fabric, 
and Europe’s too, which should be taken into account. 
The recent past shows that Belgian ﬁ  rms are generally in 
good ﬁ  nancial health and that their debt levels are reason-
able. In 2001, equity accounted for roughly 40 % of the 
liabilities side of the balance sheet of Belgian industrial 
companies, thus placing Belgium midﬁ  eld in relation to 
the other EU-15  countries. As is the case in the euro area 
as a whole, the ﬁ  nancial accounts indicate that shares, 
the overwhelming majority of which are unlisted, provide 
the basis for a good 50  % of funding. An increasing 
proportion of shares are now held abroad. Moreover, the 
ﬁ  nancing conditions do not appear to be unfavourable 
either and are not liable to slow down the development 
of companies activity. In the recent past the relative level 
of lending conditions to SMEs has tended to increase. 
However, this was very likely the result of a catching-up 
exercise whereby Belgian banks moved into line with the 
prevailing conditions in other EU countries, a fact which is 
underlined by the ECB’s harmonised rate survey.
In the context of increasingly close integration of European 
ﬁ   nancial markets, a policy ensuring that Belgian ﬁ  rms 
and, in particular, the numerous SMEs and ﬂ  edgling 
companies are adequately funded, must support the aim 
of an innovative and buoyant economy. There are few 
multinationals in the Belgian economy with access to the 
international ﬁ   nancial markets. However, it is home to 
many foreign companies (with loans between afﬁ  liated 
companies representing a major form of funding) and 
its SMEs draw a large part of their funds from unlisted 
shares, while at the same time remaining dependent on 
loans from local banks.35
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SMEs in particular should be in a position to access a 
whole range of funding methods  ; the necessary condi-
tions to do this include the preservation of access to bank 
loans, the development of the venture capital market and 
the emergence of ﬁ  nancial markets designed for smaller 
companies and with the task of providing a link from 
venture capital once a company has reached a certain 
stage of development. In this respect, the Belgian ven-
ture capital market exhibits several distinctive, potentially 
weakening, features in a European context. Firstly, even 
though it compares quite favourably with the European 
average, it remains modest in size, both in terms of funds 
collected or invested. Secondly, it is largely dependent on 
public funding, due, among other things, to the lesser 
importance of institutional investors who are subject to 
more rigorous investment constraints. Finally, while it 
focuses heavily, and indeed more so than elsewhere, on 
high technology, it has in the past concentrated on the 
initial stages of company development. This in itself is a 
positive factor yet it increases the risk of a subsequent 
vacuum. An orderly and targeted raising of the restric-
tions on institutional investors could help in meeting this 
requirement, as could the putting in place of an organised 
market, a role which could be ﬁ  lled by the newly-created 
Euronext Brussels free market.
2.2.5 Environmental  policy
Several international agreements aimed at reducing pol-
lutant emissions reﬂ  ect the growing awareness over the 
past few years of the need to contain the environmental 
cost of economic activity. The requirement for sustain-
able development, which also forms an integral part of 
the Lisbon strategy, has signiﬁ   cant implications for the 
production methods of companies, especially those in the 
industrial sector. At ﬁ  rst sight, it may therefore be seen 
as restricting and a source of additional costs. However, 
apart from representing the corporate world’s fair con-
tribution in response to the needs of society, it may also 
prove to be an opportunity. Insofar as this growing aware-
ness tends to be shared at international level, an industry 
may ﬁ  nd an innovative way forward in the development 
of more environmentally-friendly production techniques. 


































































































































































































































Investor type Role of foreign countries Stage of investment Beneficiary sector
CHART 22  VENTURE CAPITAL IN BELGIUM
  (Percentages of the total, average funds invested 1999-2003)
Source : European Venture Capital Association.
(1) Management  buy-out / management buy-in.






























in themselves, can, if appropriate, be marketed abroad or 
used to improve or manufacture existing industrial prod-
ucts more efﬁ  ciently, thereby providing innovative compa-
nies in this ﬁ  eld with a new competitive edge. Moreover, 
the recent “Kok report” (2004) places a sustainable 
environment and the attainment of a leading position 
in eco-industry in particular, among the ﬁ  ve policy areas 
requiring urgent action as part of the Lisbon process  (1).
The environmental objectives naturally affect all economic 
players. Households therefore have an essential role to 
play in terms of waste policy, which accounts for two 
thirds of current environmental protection spending. 
Although the biggest forms of pollution are waste and 
water-related, the only accurate and recent ﬁ  gures avail-
able are for air pollution.
It is this last form of pollution which is of primary concern 
to industry. Its share in the total of the ﬁ  ve types of pollut-
ant emissions recorded  (2), which ranges from 27 to 66 p.c. 
over the period from 1990 to 2001, is in fact greater 
than its share in value added (20 p.c.). Certain industries, 
such as the reﬁ  ned petroleum products branch, chemi-
cals, non-metallic mineral products and basic metals, are 
particularly polluting. A cumulative approach, based on 
the input-output table, and which also takes account of 
pollution caused by intermediate consumption, shows 
that the most polluting products to manufacture are basic 
chemicals and iron and steel.
Some efforts have already been made  : from 1990 to 
2001, most types of emission were cut, sometimes sub-
stantially, albeit to a lesser extent in the industrial sector 
than for ﬁ   rms as a whole. Although these efforts are 
moving in the right direction, there is still a considerable 
way to go to achieve the European Gothenburg 2010 
targets in terms of acidiﬁ  cation  and  photochemicals. 
Furthermore, greenhouse gas emissions have increased 
since 1990 – less so in industry than for ﬁ  rms  as  a 
whole – distancing Belgium from its reduction target of 
7.5 p.c. agreed upon in the Kyoto protocol.
Even though the targets of international agreements 
relate to emission volumes, the efforts made by indus-
try may also be judged based on how its eco-efﬁ  ciency 
changes. Eco-efﬁ  ciency compares industrial activity with 
the pollutant emissions that this activity causes. From this 
viewpoint, the development is favourable  : between 
1990  and 2001, eco-efﬁ   ciency for ﬁ   rms as a whole 
improved, from 17 to 107 p.c. depending on the type of 
pollution, including for greenhouse gases. This indicates 
that pollutant emissions have risen less sharply than activity, 
and have fallen in some cases. Eco-efﬁ  ciency gains proved 
to be lower in industry. However, the performance of the 
most polluting industrial branches has been patchy, from 
excellent for chemicals, neutral to positive for basic metals 
and negative overall for reﬁ  ned petroleum products and 
non-metallic mineral products. In the reﬁ  ned petroleum 
products branche especially, although emissions have 
fallen, the reduction in activity has been even greater, 
resulting in an important loss of eco-efﬁ  ciency.
The environmental spending of the economy as a whole is 
on the rise. The enterprises, for their part, have ﬁ  nanced 
59 p.c. of the national expenditure on environmental 
protection in 2002, against 53 p.c. in 1997. This growth 
only affected current expenditure whereas the share 
of environmental investments in their total investment 
remained stable. As for the most polluting branches, the 
share of environmental investments in overall investments 
is much greater than the average (between 4.4 and 
6.1 p.c. compared with 1.8 p.c. for ﬁ  rms as a whole).
(1)  One can also mention, by way of example, the automotive industry, which is the 
subject of an in-depth analysis in the EC’s last competitiveness report (EC, 2004a). 
The widespread demand for less polluting vehicles should guide R&D and 
enable the EU to gain a comparative advantage in this respect by adopting a 
pioneering role, which will be essential in conquering the potentially enormous 
Chinese market for motor vehicles. Although R&D capacities in this area barely 
affect Belgium, it will be able to turn it to its advantage through its role as an 
assembler.

































CHART 23  INDUSTRIAL AIR POLLUTION
   (Percentages, 1990-2001)
Source : FPB.
(1) 1990-2001  average.
(2)  Change between 1990 and 2001.
(3)  Defined as output per unit of pollutant emissions.37
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2.3  Industrial and innovation policies
Faced with rapid changes in the global economy, and the 
implications of such changes for industry and other sec-
tors of activity in Belgium, there are a whole range of fac-
tors that can enhance the economy’s adaptability, its com-
petitiveness and its prosperity. In this context, government 
and the social partners are called upon to employ a wide 
array of instruments, while reconciling the action they 
take with all of the societal objectives. In particular, what 
is generally referred to as industrial policy must hence-
forth be regarded in terms of an integrated and consistent 
approach, encompassing for example, the formation of 
revenue, education, research and innovation, the orienta-
tion of public expenditure or the environment.
2.3.1  Concepts and development of industrial policy
In its traditional sense, industrial policy can be deﬁ  ned as 
using a series of instruments to support and promote cor-
porate activity, indeed to steer the sectoral specialisation 
of the economy. Over time, the focus of industrial policy 
has changed and its sphere of activity has widened, both 
in Belgium and in the other countries of the EU, these 
developments being guided, to a considerable extent, by 
European bodies.
Protecting sectors in difﬁ  culty or furthering the develop-
ment of sectors considered as promising was the aim of 
the sectoral policies of the 1970s and 1980s. However, 
because of the negative judgement passed on these poli-
cies, from 1990, a horizontal policy, centred around the 
framework of economic activity, R&D and adaptation to 
structural changes, was implemented at European level in 
order to put in place the necessary conditions in terms of 
EU competitiveness. Since the Lisbon summit in 2000, the 
importance of such factors as innovation, acquisition and 
dissemination of knowledge, including informal knowl-
edge and knowledge integrated into human capital, as 
conditions for maintaining and increasing competitive-
ness, has been emphasised. This includes increasing 
research efforts, as part of a national or regional innova-
tion system within which synergies are created between 
all of the players involved in the acquisition of knowledge 
and in the development and implementation of innova-
tions, namely ﬁ  rms, workers and government. At present, 
priority continues to be given to the horizontal approach, 
in spite of a certain turnaround in 2002 as a result of 
which some Member States provided a reminder of the 
need to take account of speciﬁ  c branch features when 
deﬁ  ning policies.
In this framework, industrial policy must be seen in the 
broad sense, as the result of the interaction between dif-
ferent types of policy each with its own aim, involving a 
broad range of instruments. The shaping of the innovation 
policy is itself constantly being adapted. From now on, the 
focal point of this must be the setting-up of innovation 
systems where interaction creates, spreads and deploys 
new knowledge, therefore going beyond a linear process 
according to which R&D conducted in isolation leads to 
the development of innovative products and a competi-
tive economy. It is beginning to emerge that innovation 
is not restricted to the ﬁ  elds of scientiﬁ  c or technological 
research, but that it can be placed at the core of all of the 
policies, including in environmental and social areas.
2.3.2   Lessons to be learnt from the experience of 
innovative economies
In the absence of a universally acknowledged miracle 
cure, analysing the experiences of what are deemed to 
be the most dynamic European economies can provide 
a wealth of lessons as part of a benchmarking process, 
even if it is unlikely that they can be transferred exactly 
as they are.
Among the countries of the EU, Finland is the most 
commonly-cited example of an innovative and buoyant 
economy, supported in particular by its telecommunica-
tions sector. However, one cannot speak of offensive 
sectoral policy insofar as, following a major economic 
crisis at the start of the 1990s, the Finnish economy 
aimed above all to implement a framework conducive 
to economic restructuring. This policy showed a clear 
willingness to attach vital importance to R&D and inno-
vation, as well as to education, and was implemented 
by setting-up a national innovation system, providing 
a structured framework consistent with the innovation 
policy and possessing the following main features  : 
establishing contact links between a large number of 
players, cooperation between the academic, research 
and entrepreneurial circles, the participation of SMEs, 
public bodies which centralise responsibility for deﬁ  ning, 
funding and continued assessing both applied and pure 
research programmes. This framework helped create a 
national consensus, with all of the players agreeing on 
the objectives to be pursued.
In addition to this national example, there are a number 
of European regions which are also particularly dynamic. 
Several studies have attempted to identify the best per-
formers among the regions  –  i.e. those undergoing rapid 
development (disregarding any catch-up effect) compared 
to the average growth of the EU – and to isolate the 
causes of their success  (1). (1)  Cf. EC (2003b) for example.38
The regions highlighted in this type of study each display 
speciﬁ  c characteristics, such as with regard to the type 
of production (mainly high-tech industry in Oberbayern, 
the preservation of a more traditional industrial pres-
ence in Baden-Württemberg, services in Île-de-France 
and London) or the importance of R&D activities (under-
developed in Niederösterreich, the region around Vienna, 
unlike in Oberbayern). Nevertheless, certain common fea-
tures are also evident :
–   these regions include a major city, at the centre of a 
sophisticated communication and transport network ;
–   they promote entrepreneurial spirit and collaboration 
between universities and ﬁ  rms ;
–   they can generally boast of the presence of high-tech-
nology clusters ;
–   spillover effects have arisen, made possible by existing 
networks and the sharing of a common vision by all of 
the partners involved.
It also seems that the public authority has always played 
an active role, not just through putting framework condi-
tions (transport, communication, low cost energy supply) 
in place, but also in assisting regional development and 
facilitating contact between different players so as to 
improve the synergies between them as part of an inte-
grated approach. To this end, governments have often set 
up and piloted centres aimed at bringing together players 
from different backgrounds so as to ensure coordination 
of the regional strategy. The State’s role as the (primary) 
user of innovations must not be forgotten either  ; nei-
ther is this role limited to traditional domains such as 
the defence industry, which, in France, has contributed 
to the dynamism of the Île-de-France region, where it is 
concentrated.
Any industrial and innovation policy needs to be constantly 
rethought and adapted. This is why the Finnish govern-
ment is now considering how to prevent its economy 
from resting on its laurels and to prepare it to face up to 
the challenges in store. Included among its objectives to 
remedy present shortcomings are the need to diversify an 
economy which is too specialised, the switch from a policy 
deemed too technological and scientiﬁ  c to one which is 
centred more on innovation (marketing, etc.), especially in 
the social sphere (healthcare, welfare), measures to galva-
nise the entrepreneurial spirit, considered particularly low 
at the time being, and measures to make Finland more 
attractive to foreign investment and labour.
2.3.3   Main features of the industrial and innovation policy 
in Belgium
Although essentially the responsibility of the regions, 
industrial policy in Belgium is still largely based on a 
common vision, due to the past, the responsibilities 
assumed by the federal State and the European frame-
work. In this respect, industrial policy in Belgium has gen-
erally evolved in a similar fashion to the rest of the EU, and 
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First of all, it seems to be an acknowledged fact that 
resorting to defensive-type sectoral policies must remain 
an exception and must be governed by strict rules. 
Therefore, providing provisional assistance to an activity 
in decline in an attempt to facilitate conversion to a new 
activity, whilst complying with community regulations, 
especially relating to competitiveness (state aid, etc.), is 
permissible. Furthermore, horizontal policies, such as the 
training policy, are suitable for enabling inevitable changes 
to be faced since they promote labour adaptability. Over 
the years, defensive sectoral policies have become much 
less important  ; what remains in terms of such policies is 
basically the responsibility of the regions.
The appropriateness of offensive sectoral policies, the aim 
of which is to promote the development of a sector or a 
business line considered to be promising, is a more keenly 
debated issue. Opinions on the issue are divided, depend-
ing on who is believed to be better placed to identify the 
sectors of the future – the markets or the government. 
Such a policy remains a reality all the same, both in France 
on the grounds of its interventionist tradition, brought 
back into fashion by the Beffa report (2005) which advo-
cates the launch of “mobilising programmes for industrial 
innovation” and in Germany where the volume of sectoral 
aid (including defensive aid) has remained relatively high. 
In Belgium, offensive sectoral policies continue to pervade 
the policies initiated in the different regions of the coun-
try. Thus, the different regional policy declarations made 
in summer 2004  all stated the intention to support those 
sectors regarded as promising.
For more than a decade, most industrial policies have 
however been horizontal in nature. They either aim to set 
up a favourable framework for economic activity (infra-
structure, organisation of product and factor markets, 
entrepreneurial spirit, innovation, etc.) or they inﬂ  uence 
the entrepreneur’s decision-making parameters (taxation, 
investment aid, etc.) more directly. The reality in Belgium 
is that these policies are determined both by European 
regulations and the sharing of responsibilities among the 
different levels of power within a country, in such a way 
that each level contributes to the implementation of these 
policies.
The EU has an important role to play in the matter, espe-
cially in terms of driving structural policies. This goes for 
the Lisbon strategy, which covers innovation and knowl-
edge, the labour market and social cohesion, as well as 
the environment. The EU is also playing a more active role 
by initiating and supervising major transnational infra-
structure projects such as the trans-European network 
programmes (rail, electrical, broadband networks), setting 
standards (adopting the GSM standard for example), 
entering into multilateral accords within the framework 
of commercial policy, and contributing to the funding of 
structural policies.
It is important for Belgium to play an active part in these 
European initiatives and, in particular, to feature in the 
major transnational programmes. Moreover, the overall 
effort of the Belgian government may be judged partly in 
terms of the level of public investment  ; however, as has 
already been mentioned, this is particularly low.
In terms of responsibilities, each of the entities, both fed-
eral and federate, has a role to play :
–   the federal State inﬂ  uences the economy’s price com-
petitiveness through its income and taxation policies. 
Non-price competitiveness, for its part, can contribute 
to achieving compliance with a competition policy by 
developing competition authorities, improving the way 
in which the ﬁ   nancial markets work and increasing 
public investment in its areas of responsibility, notably 
air and rail transport ;
–   the communities have a major role to play in the devel-
opment of human capital and pure research, key factors 
for endogenous economic growth ;
–   the regions have a number of responsibilities which 
impact on the economic framework, notably the envi-
ronment, town and country planning, mobility (public 
works, especially roads), applied research, training, 
supporting local government, the use of European 
Structural Funds and the development of certain areas, 
whether rural, neglected or urban centres. They can 
also encourage economic activity directly through aid, 
especially for investment and research purposes.
The government therefore has a whole range of instru-
ments to create an environment conducive to economic 
activity, but which does not necessarily require the mobi-
lisation of considerable ﬁ  nancial resources. Public action 
must be ongoing in order to best adapt regulations and 
the decisions resulting therefrom to a changing context 
and to the characteristics of the regional, national and 
European economy. However, the role of government 
must extend beyond the general framework. Hence, 
some of the best performers among European regions 
have beneﬁ  ted from active government support, in par-
ticular through the setting-up and piloting of meeting 
points between the players affected by the develop-
ment of innovation poles (universities, research centres 
and ﬁ  rms). Achieving a national consensus based on a 
common vision of the goals and the resources to be used 
to get there guarantees maximum efﬁ  ciency, especially in 
terms of the spillover effects from one innovative activity 
towards others or to the economy as a whole.40
Of the three neighbouring countries, it is in the Netherlands 
that corporate policy is integrated to best effect, a number 
of responsibilities being brought together under the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs. In 2003, a detailed analysis 
was also carried out in order to assess the current state of 
the national innovation system, and on this basis several 
guidelines for the future have been worked out. In the two 
other countries, the systemic approach has been further 
developed at regional level. In France, a major networking 
policy has been developed by setting up clusters, known 
as “Systèmes productifs locaux”, followed by competitive-
ness poles, the list of which was made public in July of this 
year. The aim of such poles is to network ﬁ  rms, research 
centres and higher education establishments in order to 
promote the development and concentration of synergies 
within the same geographical zone and same dominant 
sector. Based on this approach, the hope is to achieve a 
critical size which allows a comparative advantage to be 
gained around an innovative and targeted project. These 
poles will beneﬁ  t from public funds in the form of tax 
and social relief, and, in particular, loans granted by new 
agencies for innovation and research. As far as Germany 
is concerned, even though it has some of Europe’s most 
dynamic regions, regional performance in economic and 
technological terms varies greatly.
In Belgium, the regions undertake to varying degrees the 
search for synergies and coordinated policies through 
regional innovation systems, or the promotion of clus-
ters. In some respects, Flanders appears to have acted 
earlier, on a larger scale and in integrated fashion, but 
accurately assessing the results obtained is far from easy. 
Cooperation between ﬁ  rms therefore remains the excep-
tion rather than the rule. In Wallonia, clustering policies 
have been developed later than in Flanders  ; an initial 
assessment of these policies resulted in the improvement 
of the tool and the launch of competitiveness poles based 
on the French model. Finally, the Brussels Capital Region 
seems less advanced in this ﬁ  eld, perhaps as a result of 
speciﬁ  c town and country planning constraints.
Generally speaking, a certain synergy between the three 
regions’ innovation policies would be beneﬁ  cial,  as 
pointed out by the “High Level Group 3 %” (2005). More 
in particular, the different entities might consider bolster-
ing the potential of Brussels as a centre of activity. The 
experience of the successful European regions shows that 
they have beneﬁ  ted from the presence of a major city 
playing this catalyst role.
Conclusion
Faced with repeated questions regarding the future of 
industry in Belgium, this article has assessed the past 
developments and the current situation in an attempt to 
outline the steps to be taken if industry is to meet the 
challenges to come.
Over the course of the last few decades, industry and the 
economy as a whole have been subject to two inescap-
able underlying forces, namely sectoral changes, basically 
in the shape of the transfer of activities and jobs from 
industry to services, and the increasing globalisation of 
numerous areas of the economy. In all of the countries 
with so-called old industry, but even more so in Belgium 
due to its degree of openness and its specialisation in 
semi-ﬁ  nished products, industry has responded to these 
changes by achieving considerable productivity gains, 
thanks in particular to an increase in capitalisation, and 
by refocusing on its core business. This has enabled the 
volume of industrial activity in Belgium to grow at a rate 
that is in line with that of the economy as a whole, leav-
ing the share of industry in economic activity, measured 
at constant prices, virtually unchanged. However, this 
positive response has also brought some painful adjust-
ments as regards employment. Although these latter have 
taken the form of a dramatic reduction in the number of 
industrial jobs – more than offset by job creation in the 
service sector, partly linked to the outsourcing of tasks by 
industry –, they have been particularly felt at the level of 
certain branches or regions.
Recently, globalisation, being a source of challenges and 
opportunities and being synonymous with an increased 
division of the production process, has again accelerated 
as nearby emerging economies such as the ten new EU 
Member States, or large emerging economies, such as 
China, have appeared. The ensuing fears that production 
activities will be relocated to these countries on a massive 
scale, are not presently borne out by the indicators avail-
able for Belgium. However, these indicators, which are of 
a mainly ﬁ  nancial nature, are partial and ﬂ  awed for meas-
uring this trend, which in turn is likely to change quickly. 
Hence, some surveys indicate that relocation is occupy-
ing the thoughts of many chief executives, and leading 
to effective decisions to reallocate activity. Furthermore, 
some of these emerging economies, including China, 
are rapidly progressing towards stages of development 
more focused on higher-technology products and innova-
tion. It is therefore important to take an in-depth look 
at the nature of the developments still to come and the 
responses needed in order to position Belgian ﬁ  rms  in 
geographical markets and in growth activities.41
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In this respect, what is at stake more than ever is the safe-
guarding and improvement of the economy’s competitive-
ness. Competitiveness, in the broad sense of the term, 
is characterised as much by factors directly determining 
the cost of production (compensation and productivity 
of production factors, intermediate inputs) as by factors 
determining the attractiveness and the innovative poten-
tial of an economy, by inﬂ  uencing product quality and 
differentiation, the effective organisation of the produc-
tion process, etc.
In an increasingly competitive international environment, 
production costs remain a key factor in the overall com-
petitiveness of an economy and as such, they must be 
closely monitored in order to ensure that they develop in 
a reasonable manner. Competitiveness, however, should 
not have to be wholly reliant on production costs. First 
of all, as far as hourly wage costs are concerned, emerg-
ing economies have an obvious advantage which simply 
cannot be rivalled, even if such an advantage must be 
regarded in terms of continued lower productivity. A 
comparison of production costs is more meaningful with 
respect to the countries of the EU-15, especially neigh-
bouring countries, which constitute the main markets 
for our products and are our direct competitors in the 
allocation of the design, production and distribution 
process phases deﬁ  ned at European and global level. In 
this connection, it should be noted that Belgian industry 
has limited control over its production cost, which is more 
dependent on intermediate imports than is the case else-
where, even though the single currency is making a major 
contribution by eliminating exchange rate ﬂ  uctuations 
between euro area partners. However, this does not mean 
that the development of cost constituents determined 
in Belgium, both in industry or the branches to which it 
resorts (wages, the level of which remains high, return on 
capital or the cost of energy) requires less monitoring.
However, it would increasingly appear that economic 
dynamism can be measured in terms of its innovative 
capacity, whether it is in the products which the economy 
offers or in the production methods which it employs. This 
capacity is the result of the combination of a number of 
factors, the extent of which, and even more so the inﬂ  u-
ence on the competitiveness of the economy, are tricky 
to gauge. The article has reviewed the most important 
of these factors, thus providing an outline summary of 
the main axes which are able to guide the response of 
economic agents in future.
A clear aim must be to preserve and increase the strengths 
of the Belgian economy, in particular its infrastructure 
(high rate of investment, including in ICT, transport and 
communication network, etc.) and the degree of training 
of its workforce, which together help to explain the high 
level of apparent labour productivity. Even in these areas, 
shortcomings will need to be overcome as a matter of 
priority, by increasing public investment, by steering stu-
dents more towards scientiﬁ  c and technical subjects, or by 
extending the practices of continuing training.
Moreover, in one way or another, innovation, and more 
particularly a consistent and integrated approach to inno-
vation, seems to be a central feature in the experience 
of the most dynamic European economies. Innovation 
amounts to more than just devoting 3 p.c. of GDP to 
R&D expenditure  ; it must cut across all areas and involve 
all elements of society, centred as it is on the acquisition, 
dissemination and sharing of knowledge. Within the 
framework of a small, open economy such as Belgium, 
this includes, to an even greater extent, the process of 
learning and the appropriation of knowledge developed 
abroad.
Although all of the players are involved, one particular 
and multiple role falls to government. Firstly, Belgium 
is characterised by the structural weakness of its public 
investment and public funding of R&D. Additional efforts 
have thus to be made, within the framework of a healthy 
management of public ﬁ  nances. The State can also take 
action by creating conditions which are conducive to 
economic activity and the common good. In this respect, 
despite the fact that administrative procedures are regu-
larly cited as a handicap, improvements have already 
been made, as the World Bank indicator shows. Finally, 
all government levels have a vital role to play in deﬁ  ning 
and implementing an innovation strategy. Some of the 
measures taken to achieve this include establishing con-
tact between different players, the search for consensus 
with regard to the aims to be pursued together and the 
follow-up and assessment of what is achieved. Provided 
with such a coherent framework, ﬁ  rms, universities and 
workers would then beneﬁ  t from clear and stable pros-
pects for setting up an effective system for collaboration 
and the sharing of knowledge, conducive to the creation 
and spread of innovations.
The face of industry will continue to change in the coming 
years. Industrial ﬁ  rms nevertheless have a major role to 
play in the renewal of the economic fabric of Belgium. 
By ﬁ  guring in the overall adaptation approach, supported 
by all agents, they will continue to make a key contribu-
tion to the growth of the economy’s productivity and the 
prosperity of its inhabitants.42
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